

Positions and Attitudes of Israeli Arabs Regarding the Arab World, 1990–2001

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Scholars have debated intensely whether Israel's Arab citizens are increasingly becoming hostile to the State, working within the system, or aspire to some form of cultural and political autonomy short of insurrection and potential secession.¹ Whatever position they take in the debate, most would agree that Israeli Arabs have become increasingly politically assertive over the past two decades in Israeli politics.

The following article analyses whether this assertiveness characterizes Israeli Arab attitudes and behaviour towards the Arab world (rather than the Palestinians) since Iraq's occupation of Kuwait on 1 August 1990 up to 2001. It begins by exploring their attitudes and behaviour regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war waged between the Allied coalition and Iraq and Israel's policies in Lebanon during the 1990s until the final withdrawal on 24 May 2000. Another milestone that elicited many reactions amongst the Israeli Arab public and elite was the Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty signed in October 1994 in Wadi Araba near the Gulf of Akaba. It proceeds to investigate the positions Israeli Arabs adopted toward the intensive struggle waged mainly by professional unions in states such as Egypt and Jordan that signed formal peace treaties against the 'normalization' of relations (*muqawamat al-tatbi'*) between Israel and Arab states and their respective societies.² This was by far the most complex issue facing Israeli Arabs not only because it extended into the cultural realm but also because it raised the issue of their legitimacy in the Arab world.

The article concludes by asking how these positions on foreign affairs issues help identify whether Israel's Arabs are embarking on a radical approach, taking the more moderate alternative of working within the system, or maintaining some position in between. The article is based on an analysis of the Israeli Arab press, the major Hebrew-language newspapers and the little secondary source material that exists on the subject.

Initial reactions to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990 reflected a high degree of pluralism in the Arab sector ranging from mild criticism to strong support.³ The Israel Communist Party and its mouthpiece *al-Ittihad* levelled criticism at Saddam Hussein for invading Kuwait. Even if Kuwait was historically part of Iraq, the use of force was no way to resolve the issue.

The occupation of Kuwait is a major mistake, which deserves total condemnation. Iraq must withdraw and return to Kuwait its sovereignty. Even if Kuwait is a part of Iraqi land historically, one should not solve the problem through the use of force.⁴

The emphasis was clearly on the means rather than the substance. Ironically, the Islamic Movement, on the other side of the political spectrum, voiced similar ideas.

There was a crisis called the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; it lasted no more than a few days and then it ended. Now we are living [with] the crisis called the American invasion against Arab honor and Arab land, as well as Arab holy places and resources.⁵

Even this critical position was substantively a world apart from either the official stance of the State or the tone of the Hebrew language mass media that roundly condemned the invasion. Both the Communists and the Islamists adopted positions that took into account basic ideological stances as well as instrumental interests. The Communist Party had often challenged the intrinsic legitimacy of the oil-rich Gulf states but also took a hostile view of the Iraqi regime for its brutal suppression of Iraqi Communists. The Islamic Movement had to balance between its ideological position that supported Arabic and Islamic unity with the fact that the populations of the Gulf states who obviously felt threatened by the invasion, were major benefactors of Islamic causes. The Islamic Movement within Israel might have been one of its beneficiaries.

By contrast, the Democratic Arab Party established in 1988 by former Labor Party Member of Knesset (MK) Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab Darawsha, the older Progressive List for Peace under the leadership of Muhammad Mi'ari, and the radical 'Sons of the Village' movement supported 'unification'. Thus, MK Darawsha, faithful to the party's pan-Arab ideology and identity, welcomed 'the unification of Iraq and Kuwait' in an interview in the popular Hebrew-language daily *Yediot Ahronot*.⁶ Muhammad Mi'ari, whose party closely reflected PLO-mainstream positions welcomed the Iraqi invasion as a step towards Arab unity even though he would have preferred achieving this 'noble objective' through peaceful means. He argued, however, that dictatorial leaders in the Arab world effectively preclude such an option.⁷ Least surprising was the reaction

of the 'Sons of the Village Movement', which since its inception adopted a radical pan-Arab ideology. It perceived most Arab regimes, particularly those in the Gulf States as agents of American imperialism.

There were lone voices, which condemned the invasion completely. Salim Jubran, the editor of *al-Ittihad*, the mouthpiece of the Israeli Communist Party, claimed at a symposium in the Arab village of Tamra that one could not demand the end of Israeli occupation and the establishment of the state in the West Bank and Gaza and simultaneously condone the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.⁸ He emphasized that if one considers Kuwait a *duwayla*, a derogatory diminutive used in pan-Arab discourse to refer to an illegitimate political entity, neither can one support the establishment of a state in Gaza and the West Bank that amounts to little more in territory and population. Jubran's comments reflected the wave of pan-Arabism that prevailed in Arab discourse during that period, including amongst Israel's Arab citizens.

These currents intensified as the United States dominated coalition began preparing for the air and ground war. Pluralism gave way to increasing consensus that the United States had to be roundly condemned and Iraq warmly supported. The Israeli Communist Party and its adherents changed their tone considerably from mild criticism of Iraq to strong condemnation of the United States-led coalition. The change was almost effortless, given the long traditional Communist canon of condemning United States interference in Third World states in which *al-Ittihad* had long participated. The same Salim Jubran who warned Israeli Arabs that support for the Iraqi invasion threatened the two-state solution to the Palestinian problem, now scoffed at the United States position when he sarcastically asked whether the United States 'was defending freedom and democracy in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait',⁹ This was certainly not the case he argued. The real motives of the United States were imperialistic. The United States wanted to secure direct control over Arab oil sources even in its struggle with Germany and Japan, to protect militarily 'the collaborating' (muta'winin) Gulf regimes, and to prevent the emergence of an assertive Arab state that could say no to the United States. The latter was important to ensure that Israel was the only strong political force in the region. According to Jubran, the United States wanted to use the offensive on Iraq as a means to teach a lesson to the Third World about the costs of defying its wishes. Implicit in Jubran's reference to Israel lay the hope that Iraq would be a counterweight and deterrent to the Jewish State. Leading Israeli Arab Communists, Nazareth Mayor Tawfiq Ziyad and Ahmad Sa'ad expressed similar ideas.¹⁰ They were convinced that even if Iraq was in principle wrong, it was the United States that prevented a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

MK Muhammad Mi'ari, who represented the second largest predominantly Arab political party in the Knesset at that period, went a step further by calling the United States 'the big Satan'.¹¹ Though Mi'ari used a phrase from the Iranian Islamic lexicon, he was clearly influenced by the pan-Arab sentiments around him. In an interview in the independent *al-Sinnara* he said: 'the United States does not want any political solution and played with all the initiatives to gain time to prepare for war and drown the region in blood in order to rule over the resources of the Arab nation.'¹² The Democratic Arab Party expressed similar views.

A new threshold of condemnation and claims was reached in the third stage of the crisis when the Allies began their massive bombardment of Iraq on 14 January 1991. According to an editorial in *al-Sirat*, the organ of the Islamic Movement within Israel, the United States would have invaded Iraq even if it had not invaded Kuwait since its primary goals were the destruction of Iraq and the takeover of its oil.¹³ For the Islamic Movement, the Allied Coalition after it began bombarding Iraq, seemed to look increasingly like a repeat at the end of the millenium of the confrontation between Muslims and Crusaders at its beginning.¹⁴ For the first time, the leaders of the Arab states who participated in the coalition were called traitors even though they were never mentioned by name.

The rabidly anti-American sentiments many Israeli Arabs expressed during the bombardment and the admiration for Saddam Hussein's defiance were in part hostile to Israel as well. Ahmad Tibi, at that time an unofficial adviser to Yasir Arafat on Israeli and Israeli Arab affairs and, from 1996 a member of Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, commenting on the destruction of Iraq, had this to say. 'Even Arabs like myself who oppose the occupation of Kuwait and raised it to the top of the public national agenda, nevertheless, the subject of the destruction of Iraq comes before everything else. My voice is a ringing voice, to which not many Israeli voices joined.'¹⁵

Many however, made a distinction. The Country-Wide Committee of the Heads of the Arab Local Councils (*al-lajna al-qutriyya li-ru'asa' al-majalis al-mahaliyya al-'arabiyya*), unofficially the second-ranking body in the Arab sector, refrained in its public statement on the outbreak of war from expressing support for Iraq, let alone for Saddam Hussein personally. And while it condemned the United States and its allies for embarking on a war to resolve political disputes, it expressed its regret for its civilian victims in both Iraq and Israel.¹⁶ On 7 February 1991 Hisham Mahamid, an MK from the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, along with other prominent leftists, Arab and Jewish, presented a petition to the United Nations at a Jerusalem press conference regarding the Gulf War. Although the petition criticized the Coalition's offensive against Iraq, it also resolutely condemned the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel. It claimed that Saddam

Hussein found no support among Israeli Arabs.¹⁷ Lutfi Mash'ur, the editor of *al-Sinnara*, stressed that his condemnation of the United States, 'the admiration for Saddam Hussein felt by Israeli Arabs against despotic rulers' should not be construed as enmity for Israel.¹⁸

Though one may question the validity of Mash'ur's comment that most Israeli Arabs regretted Saddam Hussein's strikes against Israel, he accurately sized up the sentiment for the Iraqi ruler. Admiration for Saddam Hussein or Iraq swept the Arab sector – political figures and the general public alike. Azmi Bishara, whose statements on Arab affairs related to Israel were in the future, to make headlines, commented: 'Though on the one hand my Arab and human honor was desecrated today because of what the Americans are doing, on the other hand the Arabs feel that their honor has been raised. Iraq is fighting and persevering, a new myth has been born.'¹⁹ Bishara, it should be noted, distinguished between Iraq and Saddam Hussein but this might very well be due the fact that he was being interviewed by a Hebrew-language daily. Once again, the pan-Arab identity he and others expressed throughout the crisis should be noted. Samir Darwish, the head of the Baqa al-Gharbiyya local council made no such distinctions between the person or the country he ruled:

What we appreciate in Saddam is his passionate onslaught against the curse of the West and imperialism and the rotten life of the rich and dissolute sheikhs. All of this makes a vivid impression. He is the only one who does not spend money on belly dancers and in the casino.²⁰

The thoughts expressed by the general public were little different. An unidentified youth in Umm al-Fahm claimed that 'this was the first Arab ruler who said no to someone stronger than he was. He is willing to die for his principles and therefore he is a hero in the eyes of the Arabs.'²¹ A write-up on the mood in Kafr Qasim once again revealed the strength of the Israeli Arabs' Arab identity. 'The occupation of Kuwait, even if it were a provocative act, serves as the destruction of the psychological barrier in the area, a sign that the borders are an utterly Western product which will not withstand the Arab desire for unity.'²² The allusion to the Sykes-Picot agreement, the identification of present Arab state borders as a construction of the West and the quest for Arab political unity not only echoed the thoughts of the leading pan-Arab ideologues but the heyday of political Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s as well. School principals and teachers who were interviewed both in the Arab and Hebrew press, noted the tremendous popularity Saddam Hussein enjoyed among their pupils.²³ Meanwhile polls conducted by various newspapers indicated his popularity among the adults as well.²⁴

Equally prevalent among the political elite, especially immediately after the war, was the linkage it made between the condemnation of Kuwait's

occupation and resolution of the Palestinian problem. Like the position of the PLO at the time, party officials and personalities argued that the double standard they felt the West had set for Kuwait on the one hand, and in its response so far to the Palestinian problem, on the other, must come to an end.²⁵

These sentiments and positions elicited an angry response on the part of the Jewish majority, including Jews identified with the Israeli left. Thus, Haim Hanegby, the general secretary of the Progressive List for Peace resigned from his post during the war in protest at the position his and other predominantly Arab parties and the Arab public had taken. He justified his resignation by saying: 'You are either on one side or the other. The unfortunate fact that each one of us chose to be on one side in the Gulf War obligates me to come to full conclusions. For if not I will be betraying my principles.'²⁶ Three days later, he regretted that both MK Mi'ari and Dawarshe lacked the courage to differ with the PLO which they regarded as sanctified.²⁷ These differences could be detected within the Israeli Communist Party itself. The substance of the Hebrew-language party organ *Zo Haderech* was markedly different from its Arab-language daily, *al-Ittihad*.²⁸

Feelings of recrimination and regret were mutual. Arab party leaders from their perspective regretted that not one member of the Zionist left with whom they were supposedly in partnership, condemned the bombardment of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Iraq.²⁹ Abdullah Nimr Darwish, the leading figure who supported the Islamic Movement's participation in Knesset elections, was sure that this failing would spur Israeli Arabs into forming a wholly Arab and united party.³⁰

Iraq's quick collapse did however lead to some soul searching. The author Muhammad Ali Taha, author of the Israeli Communist Party's literary journal wrote an article in *al-Ittihad*, which condemned the overwhelming support Hussein received from politicians, intellectuals and the public alike.³¹ He argued that all dictators including the Iraqi leader should be taken to task for repressing their citizens, thwarting democracy and obstructing development. Readers responded both for and against his position. Whether Israeli Arabs henceforth would take positions differing from PLO and popular Arab stances on Arab affairs and be more sympathetic to official and popular Israeli positions will be analysed in the next two sections regarding Arab positions towards the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and the Israeli presence in Lebanon.

To understand Israeli Arab reactions to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, a brief analysis of PLO-Jordanian relations is in order. Though it might be going too far to describe the Jordanian-Israeli relationship regarding the Palestinians as collusion as one prominent study is indeed titled, one can

hardly deny that both the Hashemites and the Israelis perceived the Palestinian Arabs to be their prime adversaries more than they did each other.³² Jordan's and Israel's shared interest in obstructing Palestinian nationalism in the attainment of its objectives stemmed from a very basic fact created in 1948. Both states partitioned Mandate Palestine at the expense and destruction of the Arab Palestinian community. Their triumph was the Palestinians' disaster. The bitter legacy of the PLO presence in Jordan culminating in Black September, the final ouster of the PLO from Jordan in July 1971 and the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in November 1971 in Cairo by the PLO's Black September group colours Jordanian–PLO relations to this day.³³

Even after the loss of the West Bank after 1967, Jordan aspired if not to restore it to the Kingdom, at least to make sure that it had the upper hand in any integrative scheme with the Palestinians. As late as the October 1991 Madrid talks, Jordan was more than happy to attend the conference in a joint delegation with Palestinian representatives from the territories instead of insisting, as the PLO wished, upon a joint Jordanian–PLO delegation.³⁴ To recall, Yitzhak Shamir's government refused to sit either with the Palestinians separately, or with the PLO. The Palestinians, with the full support of the PLO, which they tacitly represented in the subsequent Washington rounds of talks, undermined the Jordanians by conducting talks with Israel as a separate delegation.³⁵ By doing so they were proving loyal to a cardinal tenet of Fath, the faction that dominated the PLO, that the Palestinians must act independently of any Arab state guardianship (*wisaya*). A popular Fath slogan expressed it well: 'The Palestinian card is neither in the pocket of the big [state] or the small [state]'. The small state was obviously Jordan, the big state could refer to either Egypt, Syria or Iraq depending on the specific time it was voiced.

It was not surprising, given the basic suspicion governing PLO–Jordanian relations that the PLO, which was formally committed to unifying Arab positions in the peace process with Israel, took the bilateral secret track at Oslo that surprised and undercut the Jordanians. The Jordanians, by contrast, had come to an agreement over most issues with Israel as early as October 1992, but refused to proceed to a formal treaty as long as progress on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks was not made.³⁶ The latter could take some comfort that the slap in the face also struck the official Palestinian delegation in the Washington talks who were completely unaware of the secret Oslo track between Israel and PLO officials.³⁷ For the first time in the long and tortuous history between the triangle of forces, the Palestinians struck a diplomatic deal with Israel and did so without any Jordanian involvement. Even more disconcerting to the Jordanians, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), in which Israel recognized the PLO and committed itself

to the creation of a Palestinian territorial autonomy, was signed on the White House lawn under a young and vigorous United States President in his first term of office. Jordanian officials were concerned that the empowerment of the Palestinians would come at the expense of Jordan's traditionally strong involvement in the peace process. Jordan's decreasing importance was likely to reduce foreign aid to Jordan upon which the state in the past had much relied in favour of aid flows to the Palestinians.³⁸ In short, the DOP agreement reinforced Jordanian feelings evident since 1974 when the Arab states pronounced the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people that the Palestinians were increasingly enjoying the upper hand after years in which Jordan had enjoyed the upper hand at the Palestinians' expense.

One potential indicator of the turning of the historical tide was the establishment in June–July 1994 of the Palestinian Authority. Jordan was eager to formalize an Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty as quickly as possible in order to cope with the new Palestinian entity that in the words of one Jordanian observer might 'swallow up Jordan'.³⁹ Predictably, Jordan acted in kind during its negotiations with Israel by keeping the PLO and Palestinian interests out of the picture, especially when in the subsequent interim agreement in May 1994 and in the PLO–Israeli economic agreement two weeks previously, the PLO continued to disregard Jordan.⁴⁰ The only significant consideration of Palestinian interests took place when Jordan refused to formalize borders and border crossings along the Jordan River in the West Bank. Instead, the two border crossings were situated in the Beitshean area in the north and in the Wadi Araba area in the south of the country. Yet even this consideration hardly stemmed from friendly sentiments towards the PLO. Jordan felt compelled to consider basic Arab positions that Jordan as a weak state in the Arab world felt it could not transgress. The PLO was particularly miffed by the ceremony at Wadi Araba on 26 October 1994 to which at least 25 dignitaries were invited but did not include Yasir Arafat.⁴¹ So doubts were expressed by the King and Jordanian senior officials of the PLO's abilities at self-government on the basis of the PLO's Lebanese experiences.⁴²

Much more disconcerting to the PLO, however, was the recognition Israel accorded to Jordan's special relationship to Jerusalem and the Holy Mount in the Washington Memorandum of 25 July 1994 that preceded the official peace treaty.⁴³ It acknowledged 'the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem' and pledged to 'give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these three shines'.⁴⁴ Not only did Israeli assurances to Jordan undermine one of the PLO's basic negotiating goals – complete sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem – but emphasized, at least from the PLO's perspective, that the historic

collusion between the two states to contain Palestinian nationalism remained unchanged.

To fend off Jordanian encroachment on Jerusalem, the PLO reacted by banning the distribution of the *al-Nahar* daily and the weeklies *Akhbar al-Balad* and *al-Bayan* in Gaza three days later. A far more lasting impact was achieved, however, when the PLO established the Ministry of the Endowments and Religious Affairs in August to take control over all religious institutions in the territories. Throughout Israeli rule, these institutions, primarily the *sharia* courts, acted as informal Jerusalem consulates by issuing Jordanian birth certificates and passports. Another blow to Jordanian influence occurred in October when the PA, following the death of the mufti of Jerusalem, Shayk Sulayman al-Ja'bari, appointed Shaykh Akram Sabri, a well-known PLO supporter, to the position as a counter-measure to Jordan's appointee.⁴⁵ The placement of PA security men around the Jordanian appointee was sufficient to discourage local Palestinians from acknowledging his authority. Three years later, however, King Hussein was still reminding both his people and the world of Jordan's special relationship to Jerusalem in a public letter addressing the issue and the Jordanian authorities were still mediating disputes between the local *waqf* (endowment) and local churches.⁴⁶

To recall, the peace ceremony between Israel and Jordan was conducted with great fanfare, particularly on the Israeli side. Unlike agreements with other Arab actors to date, it involved neither substantial territorial concessions, the dismantling of settlements, or the relocation of their inhabitants. However, Israel's Arab citizens, particularly its political elite, did not share the enthusiasm of either the State or its Jewish majority. Israeli Arab reactions also contrasted sharply with the enthusiasm most Israeli Arabs had greeted the Declaration of Principles accords signed 13 months previously between Israel and the PLO.⁴⁷

Least enthusiastic, even critical, was the local Arab press. The headline concerning the forthcoming signing of the peace agreement in *al-Ittihad* on 19 October 1994, five days before the signing of the treaty in Wadi Araba, set the tone. It read: 'The Palestinian Authority: The Agreement [is] an attempt to maintain the state of occupation of Jerusalem' (*al-ittifaq tafrud waqi 'al-ihtilal al-Isra'ili 'ala al-Quds*).⁴⁸ A claim to the effect that the treaty maintained the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem was probably the worst accusation that could be levelled at the document amongst a readership that had long been on record for championing the 'two state–two people' solution with Jerusalem as a shared capital. In subsequent pages of the same edition, the newspaper reported that the PLO representative lodged an official complaint to the Arab League concerning the clause regarding Jerusalem, asked for its intervention in annulling it, and warned of the dire consequences

(*in'ikasat khatira*) for not doing so.⁴⁹ It also reported that the PLO considered the clause a violation of the DOP signed with the PLO and that President Mubarak of Egypt, widely regarded as the Palestinians' major ally, was opposed to the leasing of land and will not attend the signing of the peace treaty. The party itself had expressed its satisfaction with the agreement a day previously, evidently as yet not fully aware of the flush of anger from PLO quarters regarding the agreement.⁵⁰ Evidently, the headline and substance in the following day's issue was intended to correct impressions.

The daily's more moderate initial stance might have been influenced by an article it published on 18 October, by Bashir al-Barghuthi, the veteran leader of the Palestinian Communist Party in the West Bank, renamed the Popular People's Party after the demise of the Soviet Union.⁵¹ He was a frequent contributor to the newspaper. Barghuthi pointed out that now that peace was to be signed with Jordan, the danger of an 'eastern front' endangering Israel would become a thing of the past and that Israel could not possibly oppose a Palestinian state with the Jordan river as its border. He acknowledged, however, that had the Soviet Union continued to exist, and had Arab unity not become total disunity in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, that any bi-lateral agreement would have been a poor substitute to a total comprehensive peace settlement. The change in editorial policy might have been due to PLO pressure.

For *Al-Sinnara*, the independent popular weekly published in Nazareth, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was another piece of bad news for Israel's Palestinians just as were the Oslo accords. Every peace treaty with Israel, according to Lutfi Mash'ur, the newspaper's editor, reduced pressure on Israel in dealing with the real issues such as the right of return – including the internal refugees. Mash'ur was upset at the PLO for making an issue of Arafat's invitation. Why, he asked, would he want to go to a ceremony that harmed the Palestinian cause?⁵² The same issue reported that the five major political forces in the territories – Fath, the Democratic and Popular Fronts, the Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami, had announced a general strike on the day of the signing principally to the Jerusalem clause. It also publicized the statement of the Higher Council of Fath in the Palestinian Territories (*al-Lajna al-'Ulya lil Fath Fil Aradi al-Filastiniyya*) warning King Hussein to refrain from visiting Jerusalem until a final peace agreement was concluded between the PLO and Israel.⁵³

Kull al-'Arab, the other major weekly, was equally critical of Jordan at the time. Samih al-Qasim, the editor, devoted his feature article to the duplication in the appointments to the position of the Mufti of Jerusalem, clearly levelling his criticism on Jordan:

No one can deny the importance of Jerusalem to all Arabs and to all Muslims. We do not want anyone, especially our Arab brothers to

deny the blatant geographic, political, demographic truth that Jerusalem (al-Quds) is a city that holds a special place amongst the Arab Palestinian people which considers it its political, spiritual and religious capital. The Palestinian National Authority is completely justified in making the appointment. We demand Jordanian withdrawal from this matter and Palestinian–Jordanian coordination so that we do not lose Jerusalem like what was lost elsewhere.⁵⁴

Nor was the newspaper or those who expressed their opinion in it especially enthusiastic over the peace treaty. The author of an unsigned article warned Jordan of the consequences of disregarding PLO interests, minimizing its presence in the ceremony and failing to invite Arafat. The critical, even ominous tone, could be detected in the title – ‘He who disregards the Palestinians sows the seeds of discord (*man yatajahal al-Filastiniyyin yazra ‘budhur al-fitna*).’⁵⁵ The article ends with an even sterner warning directed against Jordan:

This people that taught the Arab peoples the basics of resistance to oppression – the oppression of the occupiers and the oppression of kin...will not hesitate once again to express its refusal toward attempts to reduce its stature, isolate it, make it a laughing stock, and usurp its land...

The biggest loser is the side who thinks that ‘by alliance’ with the other side and with its support, that it will be strong enough to defuse the quest for freedom of the Palestinian people.⁵⁶

Significantly, Ibrahim Nimr Darwish, the head of both the Follow-up Committee and the Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Governments, did not show up at the ceremony even though invited.⁵⁷ In a public announcement he explained his decision to absent himself. He claimed that some articles of the treaty impinged on Palestinian rights, were ambiguous concerning the problem of Jerusalem and the Islamic and Christian holy sites, disregarded the Palestinian leadership and that it was impossible to conduct ceremonies at a time when people were under closure and in prison in the West Bank and Gaza. His statement reflected the official position of the PLO. Even when Arab Knesset members, such as Talib al-Sani‘, the representative of the Democratic Arab Party expressed happiness with the agreement, they did so with reservations stemming from many of the same reasons.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, common citizens had more varied views. Some thought that peace was beneficial at almost any price, and others felt that the peace treaty would enable the re-establishment of ties with relatives living in Jordan and facilitate travel to the Arab world.⁵⁹ But even the most positive

views regarded the treaty as having formalized a relationship between Israel and Jordan that had existed long before. They therefore had reservations regarding the fanfare surrounding its signing. In short, Israel's Arab citizens more or less followed the PLO's lead in its relationship with Jordan.

Israeli Arabs opposed Israel's presence in Lebanon consistently. In August 1993, Nawaf Masalha, a Labor MK, considered the most moderate Arab representative in the Knesset, threatened to resign from the party in protest of 'Operation Accountability'.⁶⁰ The Israel Defense Force operation was undertaken against the Hizbullah in response to ketyusha attacks on northern Galilee. The extent of this opposition and the depth of their animosity toward Israel's presence in Lebanon reached new heights during the 'Grapes of Wrath' operation in April 1996, particularly after the Kafr Kana incident. The 'Grapes of Wrath' began on 10 April 1996 in response to escalating Hizbullah rocket attacks on northern Israel. The operation involved increasing Israeli troop levels in its occupied security zone in southern Lebanon and heavy retaliatory bombardment against Hizbullah. The Israeli army had the capability rapidly to return accurate fire against an area from where Hizbullah had launched rockets. Using this to its advantage, Hizbullah on 18 April launched rockets from the vicinity of the United Nations refugee camp in Kafr Kana. The Israeli army returned fire and its artillery shells unintentionally killed over 100 Lebanese civilians, mostly women and children.⁶¹

At first, the intervention into Lebanon did not precipitate either massive or violent protest. To the contrary, the Supreme Follow-up Committee for the Affairs of the Arab Masses (*lajnat al-mutaba'a al-'ulya li-shu'un al-jamahir al-'arabiyya*) had agreed in a meeting with Prime Minister Peres on 15 April to end the protest campaign that it had called two days previously.⁶²

This was not the tone set by the Arab Israeli press, however. *al-Ittihad* was the most critical. Two days before the Kafr Kana incident, the front page headline read 'A Protest demonstration in condemnation of the aggression on Lebanon and the blockade on Palestine will take place in Nazareth, today' followed by a subheading, 'The Delegation of the Follow-Up Committee is Stopping its Protest Activities!'⁶³ The newspaper, by juxtaposing the two headlines, was obviously castigating the placating stance taken by the Israeli Arab sector's highest body. The delegation had met Prime Minister Shimon Peres to protest against Israeli policy regarding the Palestinians and the Lebanese. By the day of the tragedy, the Kafr Kana incident was being described as 'the Peres Massacres in Lebanon'.⁶⁴

Though the headlines in the more commercial and popular *al-Sinnara* were more subdued, the tone of the columnists was no less vitriolic than the Communist newspaper. Dr Adnan Bakariyya in an article 'Grapes of Wrath,

Goals and Lessons' wrote:

The devastating war the Labor government is waging against the Lebanese people has removed the last disguise from the faces of the aggressor Israeli rulers and exposed the intentions of the Labour government. It has attempted through the shedding of blood and the lobbing-off of parts of Lebanon to increase its chances in the parliamentary elections by demonstrating its boldness and military capability before the Israeli right.

What concerns us as members of mankind and from our position as citizens in the state of Israel is the perceived need to bring an end to the bloodshed of either Lebanese or Israelis. We cry out to the Israeli government and to its leader Shimon Peres to stop the massacre... We have to translate the destructive 'grapes of wrath' on the heads of the innocent Lebanese and Palestinians into blank ballots in Shimon Peres' voting booth. The nations of the world which stood up to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait must relate to international justice by the same criteria, stand up to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and force the Israeli war machine to withdraw from southern Lebanon...⁶⁵

It is clear that the writer identified with mainstream Arab positions. His reference to Israeli citizenship is not neutral but must be perceived as a weapon to achieve goals that are common in the Arab world. Although he writes equally of stopping Israeli bloodshed, he makes no attempt to accept even a dovish Israeli position that would equate the Syrian presence in Lebanon with the Israeli presence there.

Another article, by Walid al-Amary, entitled 'Let Shimon Schwarzkopf fall' is no less radical.

Shimon Shwarzkopf, is the very Shimon Peres, the Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, who appeared in the first day of the Grapes of Wrath war shining amidst his generals as they are explaining to him how their smart bombs are wiping out Lebanese citizens. The situation of these Lebanese citizens is the same as all the rest of the Arab citizens wherever they might be – guinea pigs on which the smart bomb arsenal is tested in the world. This was the very same predicament of the Iraqis before them.

If someone who fires a rocket of World War II vintage on a country that occupies his own is described as a terrorist, how should one describe someone who fires rockets and cluster bombs on the people it occupies, drives them away and destroys their homes and infrastructure in their own land?⁶⁶

He ends with a call not to vote for Peres.

If Peres was willing to strike at eighteen per cent of the potential votes – the percentage share of Arab citizens in the state – to secure the support of two per cent of the undecided in Israel, then we must respond by saying that if in order to placate two per cent of the Jewish swing vote he placed a siege on the Palestinian people in its land and waged a mad war against Lebanon, why should we remain complacent in the face of this hatred towards us and our role...

The third columnist to appear in the newspaper that day, Sahara Abu Aqsa, identified most with Syria, Israel's major antagonist:

The blackout in Beirut will last for a long time after the Israeli rocket attack on the central electric grid... The first long night will last until the grid is replaced which is expected to last a long time, and the second long night involving Lebanon will continue as part of a political plot whose aim is to lead Syria and Lebanon into the hopeless Oslo accords...

But he [Shimon Peres] and others like him should know that what is imposed by force and by military stealth will not prevail. The situation in which states in the area must live under America's and Israel's wing will not last. The world order in which America acts alone and does as it likes, without opposition will not continue... Revolutionary movements and other forces will come back, will be born and multiply...these forces will change the scales, at which time Israel will not be able to impose its might on Beirut or on anyone else.⁶⁷

Sahara Abu Aqsa reflects the radical millennial outlook that characterized the Palestinian left in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The article could have been written in Beirut, Damascus, or Baghdad. None of the three seen from the Israeli perspective at least, attempted to judge the tragic episode in light of the larger regional context or the factors that precipitated the campaign in the first place.

After the Kafr Kana incident the differences between the tone of the press and the passive political behaviour of Israeli Arabs in the first ten days of the campaign, vanished. On the day following the incident, eight Arabs were detained for throwing stones at policemen in Nazareth, demonstrations and rallies took place in tens of Arab villages and the Follow-up Committee succeeded in imposing a general strike after it had declared two days of public mourning.⁶⁸ Member of Knesset, Abd al-Wahhab Darawsha, head of the Democratic Arab Party, issued an ultimatum to Peres that he would call on the Arab electorate to cast a blank ballot in the coming elections if Peres would not stop the campaign within 24 hours.⁶⁹

The differences between commentaries on the Kafr Kana incident in the Arab press and by Arab politicians and what appeared in the Hebrew

language press is striking. In contrast to the ethnic emotionally charged tone of the Arab press criticism, Zeev Schiff offered a technocratic cost/benefit analysis of the operation.⁷⁰

The Grapes of Wrath operation proves that the government does not have unlimited time to continue the operation. Once again it is proven that the time allotted to war is severely limited, especially regarding small countries. The surprise came in the form of two massive attacks on civilians. The operational explanation is that Hizbullah men fired mortar shells and katyusha rockets... This is what happened in Nabatiyya.

The possible answer ostensibly can be that this was a quick reaction to the sources of fire; but from a humanitarian and political standpoint there will be certain damage to Israel. This is happening to a certain degree because Hizbullah fires intentionally from populated areas and from positions close to UN positions, but the damage to Israel's image, especially in the Arab world, is unavoidable...

Even when an Israeli commentator criticized Israel for what happened in Kafr Kana it was from 'reasons of state' rather than moral arguments:

The incident in Kana will be registered as an historical sign-post in the Israeli–Arab conflict along with Dr Yassin, Kafr Qassim, and Sabra and Shatilla. The incident led to the breaking of the blockade around Iran and now the ministers of France and Italy went to meet Iranian representatives.⁷¹

Israeli Jewish commentators took for granted the pre-eminence of Israel's national security interests and weighed the pros and cons of Israeli intervention in that light even in the most compromising moral situations. The Palestinian commentators are similar to the Jewish commentators in placing politics before moral anguish (though the former no doubt felt and expressed it to a greater degree), but the Palestinians did so in defending the Arab vision of the regional order. The Arabs, including Israeli Arabs, perceived themselves basically as victims of American–Israeli hegemony.

It is clear then that in respect of the Grapes of Wrath campaign at least Israeli Arabs have not attempted to make Arabs over the borders be more understanding of or sensitive to Israeli perceptions justifying the campaign. It seems that they identified not only with the victims but also with the political goals of Syria and Syrian-dominated Lebanon.

Arab Israeli reaction to Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon on 24 May 2000 only confirmed their identification with Israel's opponents. Azmi Bishara in 'the victory celebration and the celebration of the resistance (*mahrajan al-nasr wa-mahrajan al-muqawama*) his party held on 5 June,

linked the withdrawal with Israel's victory on the same day in 1967. 'This is the first fifth of June that has transcended the low morale that 1967 left in its wake. For the first time we can feel a ray of hope concerning the Arab situation. We now have a small sample. After all Lebanon is the weakest Arab state and we can draw a lesson from it, but the most important lesson is the desire for victory.'⁷² Darawsha threatened that the party he headed, the DAP, would dissolve the coalition with the Islamic Movement if the latter's representatives, Abd al-Malik Dahamsha and Tawfiq al-Khatib, agreed to attend the special session of the Knesset in the town of Kiriyat Shmona near the Lebanese border. The Knesset decided to hold a special session in order to express solidarity and assuage apprehensions of upper Galilee residents concerning future Hizbullah moves along the northern border with Lebanon after the withdrawal.⁷³ Darawsha's threat worked. Several days later the United Arab List comprising both sides, announced that its representatives would not attend the special session.⁷⁴ Meanwhile Talab al-Sani', an MK within the UAL from the DAP, proposed that Hasan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, be nominated for the Nobel peace prize.⁷⁵

Campaigns against the normalization of peace relations with Israel have characterized formal peacemaking between Israel and its Arab neighbours since the formal peace treaty with Egypt. Two ideological currents vie to dominate the anti-normalization campaign levelled against Israel. By far the more powerful current headed by the Islamic fundamentalist and radical parties, aims at persuading Egypt and Jordan who have formal peace treaties with Israel to scuttle them altogether. The more moderate current, headed by the PLO, has aimed at bolstering the linkage between normalizing relations between Israel and Egypt and Jordan with progress, that is to say, Israeli territorial concessions, in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and Syria. Needless to say, even the more moderate current is interested in preventing the spread of the relationship to include other states. The question is what has been the attitude of the Israeli Arabs to this campaign?

A seemingly unimportant episode that took place in June 2001 reveals the basic position of Israeli Arabs towards the issue of normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states. Even more important is what the episode reveals about the linkage between that issue with their attempts at normalization with the Arab world.

The episode began when MK Muhammad Kan'an, Muhammad Zaidan, the head of the Supreme Follow-up Committee for the Affairs of the Arab Masses, the highest policy-making forum in the Arab sector, and poet Mahmud Dasuqi, made a trip to Algeria.⁷⁶ Kan'an heads the Arab Nationalist Party, a one-man list that seceded from the Democratic Arab Party just

before the trip.⁷⁷ This was the first known trip by public figures from the Arab sector to a state in which its secular elite has long been identified with pan-Arab nationalism and implacable hostility to Israel. Kan'an explained in an interview with the BBC in Arabic that the trip was 'to break out of the isolation the Arab world has imposed on the Arab world'.⁷⁸

The isolation to which Kan'an referred was a frequent issue on the Israeli Arab agenda. Especially unnerving were its cultural implications. Nazih Khair's article in *Kull al-'Arab* in 1994, entitled, 'In What Did the Palestinian Arabs in Israel Do Wrong' (*Bimadha Akhta'a al-'Arab al-Filastiniyun Fi Isra'il*), summed it up well.⁷⁹ The article begins by lamenting the rebuke levelled at the famous musician Wadi'al-Safi in an article in the Egyptian *Ruz al-Yusuf* for consenting to appear ten times before Palestinian Arabs in Israel for a million dollars. al-Safi subsequently denied in more than one Egyptian newspaper having made such a commitment. Khair described his own efforts to assure the participation of an ensemble from the village of Tarshiha in an Arab music festival held in the Cairo Opera House. Despite initial approval from the local Union of Arab Writers, it was nevertheless only through the strenuous intervention of the Palestinian Authority, especially the writer Yahya Yakhlaf and the efforts of the Palestinian 'embassy' in Cairo that the ensemble in fact appeared. He continued in exasperation:

The Arab Palestinians since [the establishment of] Israel have been silent for forty years regarding the linkage [with the Arab world] lest they arouse the anger of their brethren in the Arab world, and lest they be accused of behind-the-back normalization (*bil-tatbi' al-khalafi*)... The time has come in my mind after the series of love affairs (*musalsalat al-gharam*) with Israel to extricate us out of this game for we are very eager to interact with the great Arab homeland.⁸⁰

If Kan'an had any hopes to address this painful issue, they were quickly dashed by the Algerians. No sooner had the three arrived in Algeria and made known their presence there to the Israeli Arab public that they were castigated for travelling to Algeria to promote normalization between Algeria and Israel. *al-Sinnara* reported that an Algerian newspaper had characterized Muhammad Kan'an and those accompanying him as the representatives of the blood-thirsty (*saffah*) Sharon.⁸¹ It then went on to contrast Kan'an's claims to have met the foreign minister, a prominent academic in the Arab University and to be staying at an official Presidential residence, with Algerian media reports that they were being boycotted by Algerian officials and public alike. Responding to charges in the Algerian press that he was facilitating ties between Sharon and the Algerians, Kan'an stated that 'I have not and will not participate in normalization (*lam wa*

lanusahim fi'l-tatbi') [with Israel].⁸² He then went on to accuse Darawsha, the chairman of the DAP, from whose ranks he had resigned, of fabricating these accusations, adding that he had never facilitated meetings between Arab officials and Sharon in the way Darawsha had done between Abu Mazin and Sharon's son Omri.

Kull al-'Arab was no less disparaging to those who made the trip. Especially insulting was a statement Khalid Bin'Isma'in, a member of the [Algerian] National Coordinating Committee To Resist Normalization (*al-tajna al-tansiqiyya al-wataniyya li-munahadat al-tatbi'*), made regarding Kan'an:

This [trip] is something not acceptable even if it concerns an Arab member [of Knesset] because we do not differentiate between one member of the Knesset and the next. Even if he is called Muhammad we still consider him a Zionist and we will not accept that he set foot in Algeria. We consider it an attempt on the other side to feel the pulse regarding our readiness to normalize relations.⁸³

It was clear from the accusations and counter-arguments that normalization between Israel's Arab citizens and the Arab world had to come at the expense of promoting such normalization between Israel and Arab states.

But even this situation was far from being assured. Samih al-Qasim, the poet and editor of *Kull al-'Arab*, in an article six years after Khair's, pleaded that at the very least, Israel's Arab citizens be excluded from the anti-normalization boycott:

Many years ago in Egypt, I announced in a press conference in Cairo that 'I came from my country to my country not from a state to a state'. No one has the right to prevent us from meeting our people in our land after closure and isolation (*'uzla*). We have to explain to the Arab world that we cannot normalize our relations with Israel so long as the occupation continues and as long as there is no solution to the refugee problem. The time has arrived to get out of the empty shell and play of words. The time has arrived to delve bravely in treating the problem of freedom and democracy and human rights in the Sykes-Picot regimes of which Israel is only one episode in the series.⁸⁴

He bases his claim, however, that Israeli Arabs themselves cannot normalize their relationship with the State as long as the occupation continues and the right of return is not given to the refugees. They are therefore in the same camp with their Arab counterparts across the borders but rather than making the Arabs in Israel suffer, Arab states and societies should deal with more pressing matters such as democracy.

Though few Israeli Arabs dare to take issue with the Arab states in this manner, most also agree that they cannot be the bridge to normalization. In their relationship with the Arab world, most Israeli Arabs identify with positions voiced across the border or in the case of the Palestinians, with the PLO. The basis for the correspondence emanates from feelings of a shared Palestinian and Arab identity. Paradoxically, these feelings are intensified by the pain of being the targets of the anti-normalization campaign against Israel and the doubts cast on their loyalty to the Arab cause for being potentially a bridge for peace.

Israel's Arab citizens, political leaders and movements and the Arab language press demonstrate a keen interest in politics in the Arab world, particularly those they feel have an impact on Israeli–Arab relations and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israeli Arabs expressed their attitudes and developed positions regarding the second Gulf War, the conflict in southern Lebanon, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and normalization between Israel and its Arab State neighbours.

As almost any ethnic group living in a democracy, not all Israel's Arab citizens spoke in one voice or acted in unison. Over one issue, at least, the Gulf War, considerable differences arose between them. Nevertheless, on all occasions, they adopted positions that conformed far more to basic positions held in the Arab world than amongst the vast majority of their fellow Jewish citizens. When they differed, as in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they merely duplicated the larger debate within the Arab world rather than reflected any difference between themselves and other Arabs.

In fact, the identification with Arab positions over issues in the Arab world involving Israel has intensified during the past decade. Concomitantly, Israeli Arabs have taken into account Israeli Jewish sensitivities progressively less in voicing support for these positions. Some of this radicalization may be due to their desire to pursue their own normalization with the Arab world, which they feel, can only be secured, if they take more extreme positions regarding issues in the Arab world that involve Israel. This trend fits well with Jacob M. Landau's prediction made in the early 1990s that Israel's Arab citizens were radicalizing and the gulf between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens was growing. A more definite verdict requires a focused look at the Israeli Arabs' role in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process but such an analysis requires at the very least an article on its own.

NOTES

1. The possibility of impending radicalization is analysed by Jacob Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991: Political Aspects* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp.192–3; A more optimistic thesis of Israelization, albeit within limits, may be found in Sami Smootha's 'The Advances and Limits of the Israelization of Israel's Palestinian Citizens, in Kamal Abdel-Malek and David C. Jacobson (eds.), *Land and Palestinian Identities: History and Literature* (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.9–34. For an account that sees Israel's Arab citizens as a distinct national ethnic minority that seeks autonomy short of independence, see Oren Yiftachel, 'Minority Protest and the Emergence of Ethnic Regionalism: Palestinian-Arabs in the Israeli "Ethnocracy"', in Shlomo Ben-Ami (ed.), *Ethnic Challenges to the Modern Nation-State* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.168–71.
2. On the campaign against normalization in Jordan see 'Umar Shabana, 'Fi Ma'rakat al-Tatbi' wa-Muqawamatihi: al-Muthaqqafun fi-al-Urdunn...Bayna al-Rafd al-Mutlaq wal-Qubul al-Mutahafit', *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, No.19 (Summer 1994), pp.158–64; Asher Susser, 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,' in *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1995*, Vol.19 (1997), pp.390–2; Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, "Normalization" and "Anti-Normalization" in Jordan: The Public Debate', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.5, No.3, Sept. (2001), pp.61, 64–7; on Egypt see Meir Hatina, 'Egypt', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Vol.21 (1997), p.326; on Syria's official anti-normalization efforts, see Eyal Zisser, *Syria*, Vol.21 (1997), p.684. For an ideological discussion on the relationship between normalization, Israel and the 'new Middle East' (al-Sharq al-Awsatiyya) see Wajih Kuthrani, 'al-Sharq al-Awsatiyya wal-Tatbi' al-Thaqafi ma'a Isra'il: Al-Bu'd al-Ta'rikhi wa-Ishkalat Rahina', *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, No.23 (Summer 1995), pp.3–19.
3. Sarah Ozacky-Lazar and Asad Ghanem, *HaAravim veIsrael Betzel HaMilhama* (Givat Haviva, Israel: Ha Machon Lelimudim Araviim, May 1991), p.3.
4. *al-Ittihad*, 4 Feb. 1991 (Quoted in Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, p.3).
5. *al-Sirat*, 17 Aug. 1990.
6. 18 Aug. 1990.
7. *Hatha al-'Usbu'*, 9 Aug. 1990. (Quoted in Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, p.4).
8. Ozacky-Lazar and Asad Ghanem, *HaAravim veIsrael Betzel HaMilhama BaMifratz*, p.3.
9. *al-Ittihad*, 27 Jan. 1991.
10. Ozacky-Lazar and Asad Ghanem, *HaAravim veIsrael Betzel HaMilhama BaMifratz*, p.4.
11. 1 Feb. 1991.
12. Ibid.
13. 11 Jan. 1991.
14. *al-Sirat*, 22 Feb. 1991.
15. *Davar*, 7 Feb. 1991.
16. The statement was made on 29 Jan. 1991 in Shafr Am. See Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, *HaAravim veIsrael Betzel HaMilhama BaMifratz*, p.7.
17. *Jerusalem Post*, 7 Feb. 1991.
18. *Kol Israel* 24 Jan. 1991.
19. *Ha'aretz*, 1 March 1991.
20. *Yediod Ahronot*, Seven Days Weekly Supplement, 1 Feb. 1991.
21. *Ma'ariv*, 18 Jan. 1991.
22. *Ha'aretz*, 29 Jan. 1991.
23. *Kull al-'Arab*, 15 March 1991; *Kol haEmek veHagalil*, 1 Feb. 1991.
24. Ibid.
25. Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, pp.8–9.
26. *Davar*, 29 Jan. 1991.
27. *Davar*, 1 Feb. 1991
28. Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, p.10.
29. Ibid.
30. *al-Hamishmar-Hotam*, 11 Jan. 1991; *Jerusalem Post*, 11 Jan. 1991
31. *al-Ittihad*, 8 March 1991.
32. See Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the*

- Partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
33. For a brilliant analysis of Palestinian–Jordanian relations, see Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), especially chapter 10. Abu-Odeh, a former minister and head of the royal court, of Palestinian origin, was a target himself when fortunately the letter bomb addressed to him was intercepted by Jordanian security forces. Though loyal to the King, the book is highly critical of what he perceives to be government discrimination against Jordan's Palestinian citizens and the abandonment of what he calls the integration policies Jordan tried to carry out in the 1950s and 1960s.
 34. Joshua Teitelbaum, 'The Palestinian Liberation Organization', in *Middle East Contemporary Survey – 1991*, Vol.XV (1995), p.238.
 35. For a more detailed discussion of the Madrid peace process, see H. Frisch, *Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian Institution-Building in the West Bank and Gaza* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), ch.6.
 36. Asher Susser, 'Jordan', in *Middle East Contemporary Survey – 1993*, Vol.XVII (1995), pp.468–9.
 37. Danny Rubinstein describes how sitting around a breakfast table in the Washington hotel a day before the beginning of another round of talks, Hanan Ashrawi and her colleagues glumly conceded to Rubinstein that they had not read the agreement that had been reached through the secret Oslo peace track. Rubinstein politely handed them an English version of the text that had appeared in another Israeli daily the previous day. *Ha'aretz*, 2 Sept. 1993.
 38. Asher Susser, 'Jordan: Case Study of a Pivotal State', *Policy Papers No.53* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999), p.79.
 39. Asher Susser, 'Jordan', *Middle East Contemporary Survey – 1993*. Vol.XVII (1995) p.475.
 40. *Ibid.*, p.421.
 41. Asher Susser, 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994*, Vol.18 (New York: Westview, 1996), p.422.
 42. *Ibid.*, p.423.
 43. Elie Rekhess and Meir Litvak, 'Palestinian Affairs', in 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994*, Vol.XVIII (1996), p.165.
 44. Susser, 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,' p.412.
 45. Rekhess and Litvak, 'Palestinian Affairs', p.166.
 46. Susser, 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', p.484.
 47. Elie Rekhess, 'Israel', *The Middle East Contemporary Survey – 1993*. Vol.17. p.461.
 48. *al-Ittihad*, 19 Oct. 1994.
 49. *Ibid*, p.5.
 50. *al-Ittihad*, 18 Oct. 1994.
 51. *Ibid*, p.6.
 52. *al-Sinnara*, 21 Oct. 1994.
 53. *Ibid*.
 54. 'Murajahat Samih al-Qasim', *Kull al-'Arab*, 28 Oct. 1994.
 55. *Kull al-'Arab*, 28 Oct. 1994.
 56. *Ibid*.
 57. *Ibid*.
 58. *al-Sinnara*, 24 Oct. 1994.
 59. *Kull al-'Arab*, 28 Oct. 1994.
 60. *Kull al-'Arab*, 6 Aug. 1993.
 61. J. Matar, 'A Diplomatic Babel', *Jerusalem Report*, 15 May 1997, p.26.
 62. *Ha'aretz*, 17 April, 1996.
 63. *al-Ittihad*, 17 April 1996.
 64. *al-Ittihad*, 20 April 1996.
 65. *al-Sinnara*, 19 April 1996
 66. *Ibid.*, p.25.
 67. *Ibid.*, p.26
 68. *Ha'aretz*, 21 April 1996.
 69. *Ha'aretz*, 19 April 1996.

70. 'Israel Meabedet Zman', *Ha'aretz*, 19 April 1996.
71. Aluf Ben 'Peres Toleh Et Tikvotav ba-Amerikaim'. *Ha'aretz*, 19 April 1996.
72. *Kull al-'Arab*, 8 June 2000.
73. Ibid.
74. *Kull al-'Arab*, 16 June 2000.
75. *Kull al-'Arab*, 8 June 2000.
76. *al-Sinnara*, 8 June 2001.
77. Interview with Abd al-Wahhab Darawsha, General-Secretary of the Democratic Arab Party, 21 Jan.2002.
78. BBC in Arabic News Broadcast, 5 June 2001.
79. *Kull al-'Arab*, 24 Oct. 1994.
80. Ibid.
81. *al-Sinnara*, 8 June
82. Ibid.
83. *al-'Arab*, 8 June 2001.
84. Ibid.