The Debate Over the Revolution in Military Affairs
The American national security community is engaged in a debate
over the revolution in military affairs-the contention, advanced
by a variety of military officers, civilian officials and academic
analysts, that a new age of conventional warfare has begun or
is beginning1. It is the purpose of this paper not to take sides
on the question itself, but to define the terms of the American
discussion of this subject, to describe the major views, and to
suggest some of the consequences that flow from this debate. In
so doing, I hope to shed some light both on American thinking
and on possible implications for other countries as well.
The notion that the world has entered a period of revolutionary
change in the conduct of war has several origins. Beginning in
the 1980's American analysts began to discover, translate, and
ponder the meaning of Soviet writings on the future of warfare.
These works, which included studies by the most senior leaders
of the Soviet military, suggested that a new era of warfare impended,
in which conventional weapons would have the military effectiveness
(although, of course, not the side effects) of tactical nuclear
weapons.2 Soviet writers spoke in terms of "reconnaissancestrike"
or later on "reconnaissancedestruction" complexes, which
would allow the near annihilation of large armored formations
at depths of hundreds of kilometers in periods as short as thirty
to fortyfive minutes.
Awareness of the Soviet notion of a "militarytechnical revolution"
did not immediately translate into an acceptance of it. Rather,
the subject remained confined to specialists until the Gulf War
of 1991, which seemed to some Americans to validate the notion
that, indeed, warfare had changed. The lopsided battles in the
Kuwaiti and southern Iraqi deserts and the seemingly effortless
domination of Iraqi skies by US-led coalition air forces indicated
to many that warfare had indeed changed. In particular, the contrast
between American expectations of a bloody fight, and the reality
of Iraqi collapse, struck many observers as an indication that
some fundamental changes in the patterns of conventional warfare
had occurred.
A third source of thinking about the revolution in military affairs
came from a single individual, Admiral William Owens, a nuclear
submariner who rose to become a powerful Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1994. In that capacity, he helped create
institutions designed to maximize the power of the central military
leadership at the expense of the services. One such institution,
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which he chaired,
was composed of the vice chiefs of staff of all the services plus
other military and civilian officials. This council, however,
had more than bureaucratic consequence. Its purpose, as envisaged
by Owens, was to bring about an operational, and not merely organizational
revolution, based on the integration of three sets of technologies:
longrange precision strike, communications, and sensors. This
"system of systems," in Owens' view, would allow the
United States to dominate at will 200 mile by 200 mile segments
of the earth's surface.3
From these three sources a variety of views of the revolution
in military affairs have developed in the United States. Each
may be defined in terms of answers to four broad questions:
What follows, then, are "ideal type" positions on the
revolution in military affairs, corresponding not so much to a
single individual's views (although in some cases they do just
that) but to representative clusters of opinion. They represent
four opinions, some well developed, others barely articulated,
covering a range from firm faith in the revolution in military
affairs to no less than a firm dismissal of it.
#1 Owens' Disciples: "The System of Systems"
The first group, Admiral Owens' disciples, have no doubts that
a revolution in military affairs has begun. For them, the revolution
consists above all in the application of the information technologies
to warfare. In this view the change under way represents not merely
a revolution in warfare, but the revolution in warfare,
a change that dwarfs all others, with the possible exception of
the introduction of nuclear weapons half a century ago. Moreover,
this revolution is one which only the United States can exploit
fully and thoroughly.
The United States has accumulated phenomenal technological capacities
for longrange precision strike, communications, and sensing, but
has yet to network them and thereby take full advantage of their
power. In the view of Owens and his followers, the challenge is
not so much creating new technologies, but rather exploiting the
old ones to their fullest, those already fielded or on the verge
of coming into service. Indeed, one of the greatest obstacles
to the creation of the "system of systems"-a completely
integrated web of materiel that can look, shoot, and communicate-is
the American military's ignorance of the full range of the systems
at its disposal. Owens often shows senior military audiences a
list of some of the leading systems in each category and observes
caustically that no one present, himself included, can explain
each of the acronyms, let alone how all of the technologies operate.
As we shall see, Owens' use of a table of this kind is more than
a mere rhetorical device. In his view, it, or rather the inability
of his audiences to master it, captures the main problem of military
professionalism on the verge of a new century.
Underneath the "system of systems" lies the belief that
until now most military activity has consisted of wasteful motion
and effort. Infantrymen fired thousands of bullets that missed
for every one that hit an enemy soldier; bombers dropped similar
quantities of bombs for every one that landed on a factory, a
bridge, or a tank. Logisticians accumulated vast quantities of
supplies that armies never needed, aircraft patrolled air space
that the enemy never violated, and lieutenants leading patrols
crept through areas that the enemy did not occupy. Much of what
Clausewitz described as "friction" and even more so,
"the fog of war" resulted not from the innate characteristics
and tendencies of war itself, but rather from the deficiencies
of information gathering, assessment, and management, deficiencies
that technology, intelligently managed, can now remedy. To be
sure, the emotions engendered by war will always have a distorting
effect, but these can be vastly reduced-and to suggest otherwise
is like a primitive man failing to believe in the possibility
of anything but blurry vision because he cannot conceive of the
existence of eyeglasses.
The chief challenge to the American armed forces, therefore, consists
of an architectural problem: building "the system of systems."
The overarching idea is simple-making sure that targeting information
acquired by any system can be passed, in a timely fashion, to
another system that can then fire effectively. In practice, however,
the implementation of the system of systems will require an extraordinary
effort to standardize protocols and provide reliable links which,
for example, would allow an Army helicopter firing a longrange
missile to fire at a mobile radar installations located by an
Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle, or aNavy launched tactical
ballistic missile to strike a moving column of armor detected
by satellite a few minutes before.
To enable these technical changes to take root more profound organizational
and even psychological transformations would be required. In a
"system of systems" there exists no room for servicespecific
solutions to military problems. Ultimately, it would be desirable
(if, in all likelihood, impractical) to merge the services into
one joint military organization. Beyond this, however, Owens seems
to be calling for the development of an officer corps of both
greater technical sophistication and operational flexibility than
any yet known in the United States. It is no accident that Owens
emerged from among the ranks of nuclear submariners, a group notable
for both high levels of (admittedly, specialized) tactical skills,
and advanced technical knowledge.
The "system of systems" advocates have not described
any particular country as a future opponent of the United States.
Indeed, given their technologycentered view of warfare, they have
no such need. The technologies of today, properly meshed, will
allow the United States to achieve "dominant battlefield
knowledge" over any 200 mile by 200 mile square of the earth's
surface. The United States still outspends the next largest military
power in the world by a factor of five or more, and it has, moreover,
an unparalleled capital stock in the form of satellite constellations,
aircraft carriers and the like. For that reason, only the United
States can build the "system of systems" and thus dominate
any and all future conventional competitors.
The real threat, therefore, is not so much external as internal-the
resistance of the services to the development of truly joint organizations
and modes of warfare, and the refusal of the officer corps to
accept the challenge of a new era of warfare. Indeed, Owens himself
was in many respects thwarted by the bureaucracies he attempted
to subdue, and retired after only one two year term as Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he might reasonably have been
expected to serve for longer. The "system of systems"
revolution, however, does not rest exclusively on the vision of
one man. It is, to some extent, implicit in the reforms of the
last twenty years, and above all the Goldwater Nichols reform
act of 1986, that increased the power of the unified commands
and the Joint Staff at the expense of the services. Owens himself
may have left the bureaucratic battlefield, but the impediments
to achieving his vision have gradually abated, and will continue
to do so.
#2 The Uncertain Revolutionaries
For a somewhat larger group of defense analysts, the promise of
drastic change in the conduct of war is clear, but its course
is not. If a revolution in warfare is under way, it has yet to
progress beyond its early stages. The Gulf War and minor eruptions
of force since then-Operation Deliberate Force, for example, the
Americanled bombing campaign in Bosnia in 1995-offer samples of
what might lie ahead. The maturation of the revolution in military
affairs lies in the future, and its final shape and likely consequences
are shrouded in uncertainty.
The current (one might more accurately say, future) revolution
is, in this view, but one in a series of dramatic changes in the
conduct of war. Others include the advent of armored operations
in the interwar period or, in the nineteenth century, the use
of the railroad and telegraph in conjunction with the rifle to
make possible the effective use of the mass armies that dominated
Europe from the 1860's through World War I. Such revolutions have
a number of features in common. One country usually leads in their
implementation, although an initial pioneer may stumble by the
wayside (as the British did, for example, in forfeiting their
lead in armored warfare during the 1920's). Civilian technologies
often (though not always) drive revolutionary change, as the example
of the railroad, the telegraph, and later the internal combustion
engine suggest. The human means for taking advantage of technology
are often more important than the tools of warfare themselves.
This latter point addresses the second of the four questions mentioned
above-"what drives warfare?"-by pointing to the synthesis
of technology, operational concept, and organization. As has often
been noted, the Germans did not defeat the French and British
in 1940 because they had uniformly superior tanks or greater numbers
of them, but rather because they had developed both an organization
(the Panzer division) and an operational concept (the armored
penetration) that allowed them to exploit the new technology.
Thus, like the first group, the uncertain revolutionaries rely
less on technology per se than on technology as exploited by human
ingenuity. But where Owens' disciples define the problem as a
clear and purely architectural problem, the uncertain revolutionaries
see a more complex picture-many more intangible elements, and
a far less certain outcome.
The Germans succeeded in developing armored warfare for a number
of reasons, including the presence of a military tradition of
missionoriented tactics, auftragstaktik, that fit well
with the new weapons of war. They operated as well in favorable
financial and strategic circumstances: wellfunded if small, the
interwar German army could pick and choose its officers and men,
and could afford to equip and train them well, all within the
bounds of Versailles treaty limitations. The German military had
no competing demands on its attention and energies, unlike the
British or French, who were preoccupied with imperial policing,
and who concentrated on that task at the expense, oftentimes,
of planning for the war of tomorrow. And even so, it is not the
case that the Germans had solved all of the problems of modern
mechanized warfare by 1940, or that they were able to retain their
lead indefinitely. Rather, they had a passing advantage and exploited
it; in time others developed equal competence at many of the techniques
they had pioneered.
For the cautious revolutionaries, therefore, the chief challenge
to the American armed forces lies in fostering experimentation
and innovation.5 Inclined to mistrust the certainty of Admiral
Owens, and having a greater belief in the persistence of friction
and the fog of war, they do not believe in the "system of
systems" or any other neat crystallization of the revolution
in military affairs. They expect (indeed, in some sense hope)
that the armed forces will develop many weapon systems, organizations,
and operational concepts that ultimately will fail, and they worry
chiefly about the increasing reluctance of the American military
to tolerate radical experimentation. They note, for example, that
during the interwar period, which was particularly fruitful for
the development of naval aviation, the Department of the Navy
was willing to invest large sums of money on such abortive concepts
as the lighterthanair dirigible aircraft carrier, and did not
penalize the men who pioneered it. Today, however, when the defense
acquisition system has grown ever more cautious and ponderous,
and when the American armed forces tend to think that they have
the answers to tomorrow's operational problems, innovation has
become ever more difficult.
Fostering innovation, therefore, is the central policy challenge
facing the Department of Defense. The uncertain revolutionaries
applaud the diverse array of programs under way, and would seek
to nurture and protect them-the Navy's arsenal ship, the Marine
Corps' Sea Dragon, the Army's digitization of the battlefield
initiative, and the Air Force's first steps towards the sustained
exploitation of unmanned aerial vehicles. It will not be enough,
however, merely to fund a few prototypes or field a new squadron
or two. It may be necessary to build half a dozen types of arsenal
ship before hitting on the optimal design, even as it took more
than fifteen years of experimentation with operational aircraft
carriers to hit on the Essex class that won the carrier war in
the Pacific. It will be necessato cultivate new types of officers
whose career paths and backgrounds will differ from those of today-UAV
operators, for example, attempting to make their way in a service
dominated by fighter pilots.
Where "Owens' disciples" see tremendous opportunities
blocked only by bureaucratic selfinterest and obstinacy, the "uncertain
revolutionaries" have more somber concerns. They note that
most of the technologies driving the revolution in military affairs
have arisen from the civilian sector, and hence will be available
to possible opponents of the United States. Moreover, even technologies
more specific to the military, such as stealth, are increasingly
available on an international arms market that lacks the structure
and controls of the Cold War period. At a deeper level yet, they
worry about the distractions caused by the operations tempo of
American forces deployed around the world, which detracts from
the resources, time, and attention of the services for focusing
on the longer term development of conventional military forces.
The uncertain revolutionaries believe that the United States may,
and probably will, face a "peer competitor" in the next
two or three decades. By peer competitor they mean a country that
can field forces capable of inflicting serious damage on the American
military or deny it the ability to operate in a theater of war,
rather than, say, a few cities or a small country. A peer competitor
need not equal the United States in economic size or military
sophistication-in 1941 Japan had less than fifteen percent of
the economic resources of the United States, after all. Rather,
a peer competitor must meet certain thresholds of physical and
economic size and military sophistication, and have the motivation
to see in the United States a potential opponent. Even if such
competition does not lead to overt warfare with the United States
(as, indeed, the Cold War did not), the results could still be
unacceptable to American foreign policy and national interests.
The most likely peer competitor, and one increasingly discussed
openly, is China. China's economy may match the American in order
of magnitude, if not absolute size, in the early years of the
next century. Chinese interests clash with those of the United
States in a number of areas (including Taiwan and the South China
Sea) and China has a long and sophisticated military tradition.
That China's military today is, by and large, bloated and obsolete
offers small comfort in this view. By exploiting civilian technology,
investing large sums of money in defense, and concentrating on
military capabilities that serve its strategic interests (rather
than merely mirroring the forces of the United States) China might,
before very long, pose a serious military challenge to the United
States. And the danger, in the view of the uncertain revolutionaries,
is that the American armed forces, preoccupied by peacekeeping
and perpetual overseas deployments, complacent about their technological
edge, and confined by a "zerodefects" procurement and
force development system, may find themselves some day overmatched
by an opponent whom they viewed with disdain only a decade or
two before.
Both of the foregoing are minority views. The bulk of the officer
corps, in its heart, is more likely to have the outlook of what
one might call "the Gulf War veteran." He too believes
in periodic revolutionary change in the conduct of war, but he
would argue that it has already occurred, and that in fact it
occurred in the 1980's or even slightly earlier. It became manifest
to some extent as early as the Israeli operation against Syrian
missile defenses in 1982, but was demonstrated most clearly in
the American war with Iraq in 1991. It rests on the thorough exploitation
of modern military technology by highly trained soldiers; indeed,
it is in the American training revolution of the 1970's that the
Gulf War veteran sees the revolution in military affairs. The
creation of sophisticated training areas such as the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, or instrumented ranges
such as those at Nellis Air Force Base, coupled with careful recruitment
and retention policies have, in this view, created armed forces
that are in a different class than those of most countries. Whereas
in the past hardy peasants manning second rate equipment could
put up a stiff fight against a First World force, that is no longer
the case. The combination of increasingly sophisticated hardware,
ever more realistic training, and personnel policies that attract,
cultivate, and retain highly intelligent and welleducated soldiers
resulted in a revolution. The seemingly effortless triumph of
the Coalition over the Iraqis, in a victory whose cheapness surprised
even many of the soldiers who helped conduct it, demonstrated
that warfare had in fact undergone a major change.
For the Gulf War veteran technology is certainly important, but
no more so than the quality of training which has only recently
been achieved by military organizations. Acutely conscious of
the difference between the All Volunteer Force of today and the
conscript force of yesterday, he attributes the edge between American
and other armed forces to a military way of life quite different
from that of the days of the draft. Whereas in the past American
soldiers would spend much of their time peeling potatoes or painting
rocks, or engaging in only episodic and stylized training, today
they spend most of their time soldiering. Only militaries that
can draw on a technologically advanced population, and that can
afford to give soldiers constant and realistic (and hence extremely
expensive) training can fully exploit the possibilities of contemporary
weapons, which are indeed an order of magnitude superior to those
of the Vietnam period.
The policy challenge for the Gulf War veteran as he looks ahead
is essentially budgetary. The American defense budget has shrunk
roughly forty percent from its Cold War high, as the government
has gone from spending some 5.5% of gross domestic product on
defense to around 3.4%, with projections heading downwards from
there. The armed forces have shrunk in size by a bit less than
a third, however, and the operational tempo of deployed forces
remains high. Because American defense leaders understand the
imperative of maintaining quality, they will not skimp on pay
or training, and because forces are continually in action overseas
they cannot decrease readiness. As a result procurement of new
hardware has taken the steepest cuts, of more than 50% to $43
billion or less. The Gulf War veteran may agree with these priorities,
but he understands full well the importance of modernizing the
force (although not, as the uncertain revolutionaries would forecast,
reequipping it altogether). For him, the central problem of the
future is one of balance: keeping those attributes of the American
military that have made it so successful thus far, while continuing
to improve it. His greatest anxiety, in this regard, is a return
to the late 1970's, when the quality of personnel in the military
deteriorated because of poor pay and slack discipline, even though
pioneering technological work (the development of stealth aircraft,
for instance) paved the way for future victories.
The Gulf War veteran tends to believe that given continued investments
in pay, training, and in general all of the operations and maintenance
accounts will maintain an overwhelming conventional superiority
over any potential opponents the United States might face. In
fact, he believes, this superiority may have paradoxical consequences.
Rather than attempt to compete with the United States on terms
favorable to it-namely, high technology conventional warfare-potential
opponents will resort to measures at either end of the spectrum
of conflict. They will either resort to terrorism and unconventional
means (information warfare, for example) of fighting to evade
American conventional superiority, or, instead, use nuclear or
other weapons of mass destruction to neutralize it. In the worst
of both worlds they micombine both. Against such strategic challenges
the United States is far more poorly positioned to react than
to the action of a Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait. But conventional
superiority still retains, in this view, enormous value. As difficult
as the new threats might prove, they represent a lesser problem
(until now at any rate) than would a world safe for conventional
warfare. If the United States can make conventional military operations
against it virtually unthinkable-and by and large the Gulf War
veteran thinks it can-it will have achieved a very great deal.
There is one final school of American thought regarding the revolution
in military affairs-that which regards the entire notion with
suspicion, and even derision. In this view the whole notion of
revolutionary change in warfare is misplaced and even dangerous.
An odd coalition of military historians and downright soldiers
join in opposing the very idea of discontinuous change in warfare.
The historian notes that virtually every case of revolutionary
transformation detected in the past turns out to have taken place
far more gradually, and over a longer period of time than at first
appears. The transformation of warfare in the Napoleonic period
had its roots in the simplified tactics of French drill masters
thirty years earlier; the German blitz of 1940 emerged naturally
from infiltration tactics developed during World War I; and the
same goes for many socalled revolutionary technologies today,
such as the precisionguided munitions, which first appeared in
crude form at the end of World War II.
The soldier's antipathy to the idea of revolutionary change stems
from a visceral disagreement with the idea that technology, rather
than human nature, dominates the battlefield. Unlike the "Gulf
War veteran," he believes that the war with Iraq represented
an anomaly-a unique circumstance created by an unusually stupid
opponent who presented the American military with an ideal array
of targets. Had the Iraqis fought with somewhat greater determination
and cunning (had they been as tough and as clever as the North
Vietnamese, for instance) they would have administered a severe
battering to the coalition, although they might have succumbed
in the end. The military skeptic views with horror Owens' belief
that the fog and friction of war can be substantially eliminated.
For him, these phenomena result from the nature of conflict itself,
and cannot be removed from war until war ceases to be an activity
directed by, and on behalf, of human beings.
Herein resides the military skeptics' theory of war: the human
element dominates. Not necessarily hostile to technology, he views
with doubt the claims of technologists, and those who put their
faith in it. He wants the best weapons, of course, but he worries
far more about the right men; he is often doubtful about women
as combat soldiers. For him the cultivation of the warrior spirit
is more than a matter of having the right training ranges and
simulation facilities: it is the heart of the military profession.
Like the "Gulf War veteran," he sees the forthcoming
challenge to American defense policy as one of balance-keeping
a substantial force structure (he is even more wary of substituting
high technology for soldiers) while maintaining its quality and
sustaining modernization. He has a further concern, however. Where
the Gulf War veteran tends towards complacency about the quality
of American soldiers and their training, the skeptic views such
confidence with alarm. Moreover, he fears the intrusion of the
values of contemporary American society-which he views as hedonistic,
overly egalitarian in relations between men and women, and much
too tolerant of lax standards of personal conduct-into the American
military.
Paradoxically, perhaps, like Admiral Owens, the military skeptic
sees the chief enemy as coming from within. Doubting as he does
the possibility of human foresight, he would not be willing to
forecast what kind of strategic threat the United States will
face in the next century. He tends, therefore, to believe in the
value of a generalized preparedness for a variety of forms of
conflict, and to view with suspicion the idea of focusing on a
single, dominant threat. His true enemies, therefore, are what
he thinks to be the arrogance of the "Gulf War veteran"
and the excessive cleverness of both the Owens group and the "uncertain
revolutionaries."6 Both are the perennial temptations of militarily
successful nations, and he is skeptical enough about the United
States to believe that it might well fall in to a similar trap.
Consequences for the United States
These four views, presented with a certain degree of caricature,
represent distinct approaches not only to the revolution in military
affairs, but to American defense policy more broadly. Their views
lead to very different courses of action for a Pentagon that finds
itself squeezed by budgetary pressures that have sharply reduced
procurement, and confined by a strategic plan (embodied in the
socalled BottomUp Review) that seems increasingly unrealistic.
That plan in theory configures American forces so that they can
handle two major regional contingencies-one in the Persian Gulf,
one in Korea-nearly simultaneously. As numerous critics have pointed
out, however, American forces, on the one hand, are not sufficient
to meet the artificially demanding criteria set out in the BottomUp
Review (BUR), while, on the other, they are excessive in terms
of what is required to defeat Iraq and, in all likelihood, North
Korea as well.7 Under pressure from Congress, the Clinton administration
will soon undertake a complete revision of its strategic plan,
while Congress and private groups undertake similar, competitive
efforts.
In this context these four views of the revolution in military
affairs have serious consequences. "Owens disciples,"
who view the current international system with confidence, would
willingly sacrifice force structure and spending on current operations
in order to create the "system of systems," which would
give the United States an overwhelming edge vis-a-vis any
potential opponent. The "uncertain revolutionary" would
similarly sacrifice expenditure on current operations, but for
a very different purpose-the raising of experimental forces and
the deployment of new kinds of equipment and organizations. He
would, moreover, focus attention on such issues as personnel policy
and education in order to lay the groundwork for what Paul Bracken
has called "The Army After Next." Both the "Gulf
War veteran" and the "skeptic" would, in contradistinction,
fight reductions in force structure. Both would be willing to
tradeoff some procurement to continue to maintain a large and
welltrained force, although the "Gulf War veteran" would
grow increasingly uneasy were such a policy to be pursued for
very long.
When polled, most senior American officers will put themselves
in either of the first two groups-as believers in the revolution
in military affairs.8 In practice, however, they turn out to be
considerably more cautious, although increasingly the military
finds itself split, both among the services (with the Air Force,
in particular, taking the "revolutionary" point of view)
and within them (for example, in the Marine Corps, where some
officers quietly concede the need for sharp reductions in endstrength
in order to pursue new and different operational concepts). In
any event, whether one believes in the revolution in military
affairs or not, it has become part of the American defense debate.
The Significance for Other Countries
This debate has occurred almost exclusively within the United
States, even though it originated in the former Soviet Union and
was initially developed by Russian thinkers. There are a number
of possible reasons for this. First and foremost, even at reduced
defense budget levels, the United States alone has the wealth
and military capital stock to contemplate such fantastic schemes
as those envisaged by Admiral Owens. Other countries have found
themselves even more constrained than the United States by postCold
War defense cut backs, and hence with fewer disposable defense
dollars to throw at a revolution in military affairs. Moreover,
many of them are only now developing the institutions that could
make this kind of leap forward possible; the transition to allvolunteer
forces in Europe, for example, may set the groundwork for European
versions of the revolution in military affairs.
A second reason for the preeminence of the revolution in military
affairs debate in the United States has to do with peculiarly
American strategic problems and opportunities. In all of its forms,
the revolution in military affairs concept depends on high technology
and, with few exceptions, standoff warfare. The United States,
free (for the time being, at any rate) of extensive terrorist
threats at home, and required to project force many thousands
of miles overseas, naturally finds such ideas congenial. Moreover,
although the United States faces extensive calls on its forces
on a daytoday basis, it does not face the imminent prospect of
really large scale warfare. It has the strategic leisure, in other
words, of being able to develop forces today for requirements
that may not appear for another decade or more. Whether it chooses
to take advantage of such leisure is another matter: the press
of immediate requirements for peacekeeping, overseas presence,
and training missions has imposed on the American military an
exceedingly high operational tempo. The frenetic pace of American
military life today, with its constant overseas deployments, does
not resemble the more measured pace that fostered creative operational
thinking about naval aviation, for example, during the interwar
period.
There is a third reason for the peculiarly American cast to the
revolution in military affairs debate: many of the countries that
have the combination of resources, military skill, and strategic
seriousness to wrestle with it have been preoccupied with other
tasks. Great Britain, like the United States, still finds its
forces stretched thin by overseas deployments. France has only
begun the transition to a professional military force, which is
probably a prerequisite for further changes, and has, until recently,
failed to make the force structure reductions necessary to free
up investment for a different kind of military. Germany and Japan,
burdened with their World War II pasts, have hesitated about seeming
to embrace ideas which would probably appear threatening to some
of their neighbors. Germany, moreover, has found itself preoccupied
with the tasks of absorbing East Germany (and unification had
an important military dimension), while Japan has been plunged
in a chronic, and paralyzing, political crisis. Israel, too, has
been preoccupied with the threats posed by terrorism, guerrilla
warfare in Lebanon, and weapons of mass destruction: the revolution
in military affairs (a concept most Israeli military experts treat
with suspicion anyhow) does not seem to speak to any of these
concerns.
There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule. Australia,
with a small but highly skilled and welleducated military, operating
in a very peculiar geographical environment, has begun discussing
some of the variations of a revolution in military affairs.9 There
are various groups in Europe and elsewhere who are beginning to
write about and discuss the possible implications of the American
revolution in military affairs debate. In China military planners
appear to have reacted with shock to the easy triumph of American
arms in the Gulf and have begun paying far greater attention to
the potential of modern technology. What appears most likely to
emerge from this broader international debate is not a single
conception of the revolution in military affairs, but many, all
tailored to particular international circumstances.
As suggested above, behind the different American views of the
revolution in military affairs lie, to varying degrees, alternative
conceptions of the functions of military power in American foreign
policy. To be sure, many of those who have discussed the revolution
in military affairs have failed to present these assumptions clearly,
and may not indeed have formulated them very sharply. But undergirding
the present debate lie the peculiarities of America's geographical
position, foreign policy commitments, strategic problems and even
societal norms. Indeed, the United States shares in common with
other advanced countries some of these structural underpinnings
of the revolution in military affairs debate-for example, a widespread
sensitivity to casualties not only among the civilian population,
but within the military as well. But in other cases they represent
unique American conditions, not replicated elsewhere in the globe.
As Andrew Bacevich has suggested, what many countries face is
less a revolution in military affairs than a revolution in security
affairs-a broader term to reflect a more complicated reality.10
For a country like Israel, this includes tremendous internal social
changes and transformed external political relationships. These,
no less, and indeed in many ways more than technological factors,
are likely to force large changes in the way it structures its
military and conceives of warfare. The same might be said of many
of the other countries mentioned above. It is therefore likely
that although the American debate about the revolution in military
affairs may inform and provoke similar discussions elsewhere,
the chances are that they will lead to different conclusions,
and substantially different military outcomes.
Sophisticated Conventional War (SCW) is based on the combination
and integration of high quality target intelligence and acquisition
methods, on effective and rapid command and control, and on high
kill probability precision fire-power capable of destroying most
targets, on land, at sea or in the air, either by day or at night.
The emphasis on the word sophisticated in SCW differentiates it
from the conventional war fighting of World War II, in which the
effect of electronics, though important in cases such as radar,
remained limited. SCW evolved from the Air Land Battle doctrine
of the Cold War. This doctrine envisioned stopping the Red Army
at the Soviet front line while simultaneously mounting deep air
attacks on the Soviet second echelon.
After the conclusion of the Cold War, and even more so in the
period since the Gulf War, the evolution of the above mentioned
capabilities has been termed, in America, the Military Technical
Revolution (MTR),11 or more recently the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA).12 These names are very general and have been used
to describe other possible future revolutions. Therefore, the
more specific name SCW is preferred here. It refers explicitly
to the combination of processes and means as described above,
a combination which enables the large scale rapid destruction
of enemy assets.
This narrow technological definition of SCW emphasizes that as
yet it does not represent a RMA. It may serve as a basis for a
revolution of some sort, depending on future mission requirements
and circumstances, but in order to be indeed revolutionary, the
mere utilization of SCW capabilities, the grafting of new technologies
onto existing force components and doctrine, does not create a
RMA. Radical changes are essential in strategy and tactics, in
warfare style and in force structure.
The Microelectronics Revolution and Sophisticated Conventional
War
The rise of sophisticated conventional warfare was driven by the
microelectronics revolution and by the rapid evolution of missile
technology. In both cases the initial developments occurred about
half a century ago. The microelectronics revolution began in 1948
with the invention of the transistor; the roots of missile technology
lie in German missile development during WWII, for example the
V-2.
The invention of the microprocessor in 1971 was the major event
of the microelectronics revolution. It facilitated high capacity,
flexible, miniaturized copower, a capability which today has many
military applications: e.g., missiles, electronic warfare and
airborne reconnaissance. The microelectronics revolution has also
led to the evolution of miniaturized sensitive, solid state, day
and night sensors, which can detect radiation in various spectra,
including the visual, infra-red and electromagnetic wavelengths.
These sensors can supply high resolution pictures of ground targets,
even against complex terrain backgrounds. The combination of high
resolution sensors and miniaturized computing power has extended
the capability of precision firepower to include the location
and destruction of most types of ground targets, in addition to
those on the seas and in the air. This major change is made evident
by the different roles of precision firepower in the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War vs. the 1991 Gulf War. In the 1973, autonomously guided missiles
achieved decisive results against sea and air targets, whereas
on land only eye guided anti tank missiles played a role. During
the Gulf War,13 however, thousands of Iraqi ground targets were
destroyed by precision firepower.
The capability of precision weapons has been complemented by ongoing
improvements in the spheres of battlefield and target intelligence.
These developments have been achieved by mounting photo-cameras
and advanced sensors on a variety of platforms, from satellites
to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The latter were used by Israel
in the 1982 Lebanese War, and later, in the 1991 Gulf War, airborne
reconnaissance equipment of all types was used on a massive scale.
In the near future, the capability of these platforms, to stay
on station for a considerable amount of time and to communicate
continuously with their bases, will enable 24-hour, real-time
visual target intelligence and weapons acquisition against ground
targets.
The effectiveness of countermeasures (electronic, electro-optical,
flares, chaff, etc.: often called 'soft kill' and intended to
disrupt military equipment) against SCW weapons and intelligence
depends on the scope and variety of the threats. Nowadays, advanced
countries possess a large variety of different systems, sensors,
navigation methods and communication equipment, employing complex
modulation schemes and various parts of the electromagnetic spectrum;
all operating within a dense web with many parallel yet independent
paths. Against such variety and redundancy, it is difficult to
achieve a widely-ranged soft kill capability against many different
threats at the same time. Hence, such countermeasures will have
a limited effect on the operation of well equipped, advanced forces.
Obviously, the information war14 will play a dominant role in SCW,
both in terms of battles over field intelligence and command,
control and communications (C3). Winning both sides of the intelligence
battle, acquisition and prevention, is essential for applying
precision firepower and protecting from it. In addition, maintaining
uninterrupted C3 over one's own forces and atomizing enemy forces
by disrupting his C3 is crucial. To achieve these aims, it is
necessary to develop proper doctrines and control systems for
the effective and simultaneous use of target intelligence data
for command and control as well as for precision firepower targeting.
That is, for establishing the proper and punctual connection between
an intelligence sensor and a precision fire launcher (Sensor to
shooter connection).
In the past, mainframe computer technology dictated centralized
command and control. Nowadays, with the widespread diffusion of
personal computers, various command and control philosophies may
be selected, from highly centralized to very decentralized. A
somewhat similar situation exists in target intelligence methods,
from centrally controlled satellites to locally controlled UAVs.
Different consequences result from these options. Extreme centralization
may cause considerable delays and friction, while extreme decentralization
would require equipping firing units with organic equipment in
order to enable autonomous operation.
The evolution and adaptation of target intelligence methods and
command and control processes to serve rapid target destruction
is not easy. It requires rapid, effective and close interaction
between many different systems, which involve commanders and operators
as well as a variety of technical means, including reconnaissance
sensors, communication links, computers and display systems. The
achievement of such new and close interaction requires radical
changes in the architecture and integration modes of these interconnected
and wide-spread intelligence absorbing, processing and application
systems. However, at the present time the proper architectures
for the effective utilization of precision fire power to various
missions are not clear. The convergence towards proper solutions
for such complex, large systems would necessarily require a long
process involving extensive field experimentation. Hence, another
decade or two will most likely be needed for the achievement of
full SCW effectiveness.
In addition to the above maturation problems, SCW has some serious
inherent limitations. First, the utility of airborne reconnaissance
and precision firepower against dispersed infantry and guerrilla
fighters is very limited. A case in point is the Israeli failure,
during the recent Grapes of Wrath operation in Lebanon, to locate
and hit Hizballah forces launching Katyusha rockets at Israeli
settlements. Second, it is difficult to acquire hidden and camouflaged
mobile targets which are exposed only for short periods, such
as the Scud missiles during the Gulf War. Third, SCW is hindered
by bad weather conditions; however, future technology may alleviate
this problem. Fourth, but probably most important, SCW is less
effective in man-made and natural closed areas which offer plenty
of hiding places (city centers, forests and mountains). Urbanization
continues to take effect throughout the world, and in the Middle
East, the growth of cities has increased the number of artificial
closed areas around Israel. Such areas, where dispersed infantry
play a leading role, may become the cores of defense wherever
possible, thus blunting and perhaps even overturning the advantages
of SCW. Unless these such areas can be by-passed, they must be
attacked primarily by infantry forces.
At this stage of its evolution SCW is concerned mainly with inserting
sophisticated equipment and ordnance into existing platforms within
present force structures. It also focuses on the establishment
of command and control architectures that are suitable for fast
data fusion from various sources, and for rapid sensor to shooter
connection. Airpower15 is currently leading this trend. However,
as doctrine, equipment and architecture become crystallized and
assimilated, a better understanding of the impact of SCW will
follow, and radical changes can be expected in all major platforms.
In the air this has begun with the development of stealthy aircraft,
although massive transition to radically new major platforms will
take decades. When this finally occurs, it will lead to a veritable
RMA.
At present, the delivery of precision firepower depends to a large
extent on the ascent of the second long wave of airpower, i.e.
new sophisticated airpower. The first long wave began in the First
World War; it was characterized by ever improving aircraft, delivering
dumb ordinance supported by relatively simple avionics. This wave
reached its peak during WWII and later in the 1967 Israeli-Arab
war, finally succumbing to the onslaught of ground to air missiles
in the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. In the last twenty years we have
seen the rise of new sophisticated airpower, capable of completing
its air to ground missions despite air defense. Though mission
execution often requires the cooperation of various types of aircraft,
the achievements of the new sophisticated airpower depend mainly
on high-tech equipment (missiles, reconnaissance systems, navigation
and acquisition systems, electronic warfare systems, etc.) and
not on improveaircraft performance. This second wave of airpower
will be dominant in the air during the coming decades, increasingly
aided by ground precision fire. In the more distant future, other
candidates may rise and lead the third long wave of air power,
such as stealthy aircraft or even attack UAVs.
The capabilities of new sophisticated airpower were first demonstrated,
on a limited scale, in the Bakaa valley during the 1982 Lebanon
war. On this occasion the Israeli air force destroyed almost all
of the Syrian air defense missile batteries in the Bakaa valley
without any losses to the attacking aircraft. This was followed
by a highly successful, very large use of airpower, which also
included sea launched cruise missiles and attack helicopters:
the 1991 Gulf War. Admittedly, these results were achieved against
an inferior adversary. Nevertheless, they do bring out some of
the typical characteristics of SCW.
Before continuing the discussion of the influence of SCW on force
characteristics, and in particular on ground warfare, it is necessary
to review quickly some basic issues.
First is the impact of precision firepower on the balance between
defense and offense. In the early days of precision firepower,
following the appearance of second generation anti-tank missiles
(e.g. the Tow), it was widely believed that defense held the advantage.
However, this view is untenable; fixed, static defense positions
are vulnerable to precision attack. Also, the importance of surprise
and the advantages it confers on the attacker have been demonstrated
repeatedly. During the Gulf War, for example, this was demonstrated
in a high technology war. The war opened with an attack by eight
Apache helicopters. They destroyed two main early warning radar
stations in western Iraq with 27 Hellfire missiles, thereby opening
a wide corridor to Baghdad for other aircraft. It can be seen,
then, that it is far easier to achieve a surprise overwhelming
opening move with a small force using precision weapons. This
would lead to the conclusion that a preemptive first strike may
be of crucial importance in an open-area confrontation between
two advanced opponents employing SCW. Does this mean that SCW
favors the offense in all cases? Not necessarily. In general,
the advantages of SCW will benefit the belligerent who uses them
more effectively.
Second, the ascendancy of firepower will change the relative roles
of fire vs. maneuver in ground warfare. In the past, short range
firepower required maneuvering in order to be brought into dominant
positions, from which enemy locations could be disrupted and destroyed.
Today, however, the availability of long and short range, behind
the hill precision firepower enables maneuver by fire, i.e. the
destruction of enemy positions and armor without movement and
without having been observed. Therefore, fire can become the major
decisive factor, both in terms of defense and offense. Ground
maneuver will maintain an important role in completing the process,
but it is no longer leading it. Its primary function will be to
advance into and occupy enemy territory, thereby forcing a political
decision to end the war.
Despite such radical change in the role of ground forces, the
major short term thrust in their evolution is the transition to
the digital battlefield.16 This involves implanting digital technology
within present force structure and warfare style; it is not a
RMA at all. To be revolutionary, what is required is a true metamorphosis
to a new framework which utilizes effectively SCW capabilities.
In offense, the past supremacy of heavy armor units is threatened
by air-to-ground lethal precision fire. Passive and reactive armor
against top attack is prohibitively heavy and cannot offer a satisfactory
solution. Instead, future ground platforms will be forced to improve
their survivability by using concealment and a variety of passive
and active countermeasures. Somewhat similar to submarines at
sea and attack helicopters on land, survival tactics will stress
maximum use of concealment on the move and in firing positions,
preferably using indirect fire. These tactics are not new, but
the lethality of precision weapons requires a quantum leap in
their application as well as major changes in force structure
and the main ground platforms themselves. The developments in
the future will most likely include an increasing role for attack
helicopters and the development of ground platforms capable of
fighting mainly by indirect fire. Such radical changes will take
decades to evolve, due to the large inertia of ground forces;
if successful it will lead to a veritable RMA in open area ground
warfare. The first step in this direction may perhaps be undertaken
in the evolution of light rapid deployment forces, as described
below.
At sea, long range precision weapons threaten surface vessels
and, in particular, large aircraft carriers: the champions of
the oceans since WWII. This threat has not yet dethroned the carrier,
but it is a fair guess that in the distant future smaller ships,
with reduced electromagnetic signatures, may lead the world's
naval forces. Air power at sea will be supplied by vertical takeoff
aircraft and long range vertically launched missiles mounted on
arsenal ships. Such equipment has been available for years, proving
its worth during the Persian Gulf and Falkland Islands Wars. However,
for a major transformation in blue water navies to take, a major
shock, such as Pearl Harbor, would most likely have to take place.
Some observers17 claim that information warfare, which is becoming
an essential part of SCW, will not only be a major player but
may also become decisive. It may blind and atomize enemy forces,
thus bringing about their disintegration. However, as the example
of the Gulf War clearly shows, the current pattern of war will
remain relevant for a long time; enemy military power will be
destroyed by in-depth precision fire, delivered mostly by airpower,
and wars will be ended by the occupation of enemy territory by
ground forces.
SCW, Post Cold War Missions and Rapid Deployment Forces
SCW is the doctrine of choice of the technologically advanced
rich countries. It requires close interaction and synergy between
many expensive and technologically sophisticated platforms, weapon
systems and other equipment. It also requires educated and technologically
skilled manpower. As a result only rich, technologically advanced
countries can excel in SCW. In addition, it would seem apparent,
as the Gulf War would demonstrate, that SCW offers the possibility
of war fighting with very few casualties. However, it is important
to recognize that Operation Desert Storm was most probably an
atypical example and that future cases will involve higher numbers
of causalities; opponent may not be passive and terrain cannot
be expected to be as appropriate. In addition, poorer and weaker
countries may adopt counter-strategies, described below, which
under suitable conditions may enable the poor to harm the rich
rather significantly.
Present short term development of SCW, mainly in the US, is directed
primarily at the need to sustain and improve the capability of
the United States military to fight a major regional war. Additionally,
preparations are under way for the possible reemergence of a major
opponent, in the next 10-20 years. This path may not be suitable
for present and near future missions.
SCW characteristics, as have already been described, make current
US efforts relevant for a large scale regional war, provided it
is fought in open areas such as arid zones and deserts, where
timely and accurate battlefield intelligence may be available.
However, US military effectiveness under different conditions
will be more limited, while SCW has very little to offer in peacekeeping,
humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations: i.e. "low
intensity" or operations other than war (OOTW) missions.
The name "low intensity" is often a misnomer. At the
point of contact all operations are high intensity. In any case,
in these contingencies light, rapid deployment forces (RDF) and
special forces play a major role. A case in point is the veryrecent
assembly of a rapid reaction force for service in Bosnia.
Present and future limitations on strategic air mobility limit
the equipping of RDFs; only light equipment can be airlifted to
their positions. Hence, RDFs are not viable against heavy forces,
particularly when airpower is not available. This problem may
be solved in the future through the provision of organic indirect
precision firepower assets, including beyond line of sight target
intelligence means. One such system currently under development,
specifically for US rapid deployment forces, is the enhanced fiber
optics guided missile (EFOGM): a light weight, mobile, beyond
line of sight, 15 km range anti-tank system.18 Such assets will
enable light forces to prevail over line of sight heavy armor
in open areas; the achievement of such a capability will lead
to major changes in equipment, doctrine and organization of future
RDF. In essence, this will be a SCW version adapted to the needs
of light RDF.
Last but not least, a proper evaluation of SCW war fighting style,
as espoused by the advanced countries, requires a discussion of
the possible counter-strategies.
The Strategy of Weaker Countries and Ethnic Groups
SCW is of limited utility in closed areas (urban, mountains, forest,
jungles). Hence, less advanced and weaker countries will often
focus on the Achilles heel of SCW by adopting, wherever possible,
a strategy inclined towards infantry warfare in closed areas.
Such areas afford plenty of places to hide from overhead intelligence
and precision firepower. Moreover, short and close range infantry
warfare involves high numbers of casualties, especially on the
attacking side, giving the defender superiority, where movement
is difficult and armor vulnerable. A strategy of this sort, the
inflicting of maximum casualties, will probably become the preferred
strategy of countries incapable of competing in the SCW arena.
Nowadays this strategy is further enhanced by the increasing availability
of advanced personal weapons and equipment, to just about anyone,
including terrorists. Such arms, which are often complex internally,
are simple externally; they require very little training and are
easy to operate. The shoulder fired Stinger anti-air missile,
used by the Mujahadin against Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan,
is a good example of such weaponry, as are the anti-tank missiles
which the Hizballah in Lebanon continue to fire against Israeli
targets.
Thus, in recent decades technology has continually improved the
capability of hidden infantry to defend close areas and tot destroy
complex, expensive platforms, requiring the attacker to resort
to infantry warfare as well. Unfortunately, technology cannot
create new fewer-causality forms of infantry warfare. Even the
best equipped forces will suffer high numbers of casualties when
engaged in close combat against inferior opponents fighting on
their own ground.
Efforts to dislodge city and village-based defenses necessarily
involve heavy and practically indiscriminate uses of firepower;
as such they inevitably cause high numbers civilian casualties
and significant property damage. A case in point is the recent
Russian war against Chechnya, as the Russians persisted in massive
fire against populated areas despite wide spread criticism.
War Against Civilian Populations
Less advanced countries will try to inflict maximum casualties
on their opponent's forces and civilian populations. The home
front will be attacked by short range snipers and artillery, as
in Sarajevo, as well as by long range ballistic missiles, as were
fired on Israel during the Gulf War. Such counter-people strategies
often seek to achieve ethnic cleansing war objectives, as the
Bosnian case illustrates.
The capability of technology to counter this maximum casualty
approach, from ballistic missile defense to reducing casualties
in infantry warfare, will remain quite limited in the near future.
First generation ballistic missile defense systems, such as the
Israeli Arrow, which will hopefully come into full scale service
in the next decade, will prevent only part of the missiles from
getting through. What remains will cause considerable damage and
disrupt significantly life in the rear. Moreover, shorter range
attacks by indirect rocket and artillery fire will remain difficult
to thwart. The Israeli Nautilus laser gun system intended to counter
threats, now in early development, will also, if successful, destroy
only part of the incoming weapons. In addition, the costs of such
defense systems are very high, thus tilting the economic offense-defense
balance in favor of the offense.
Attacks on the civilian population are not new. They have been
a major tool in war throughout history. The advent of airpower
and long range missiles in this century, however, has extended
this capability to the heart of enemy territory. WWII strategic
bombings, for example, were in a great many cases directed specifically
at the civilian population, and today simple inexpensive ballistic
missiles have put this capability in the hands of less advanced
countries without modern airpower. Thus, advanced countries committed
to SCW, but not ready to accept casualties, may be held ransom
by weak opponents willing to suffer retaliation and then use it
to their advantage in the news media.
Guerrilla warfare and terrorism have been quite common internationally
since WWII, as the preferred warfare style of the weak in fighting
regular forces of the strong. Such unconventional combat styles
may be characterized as a special case of infantry or personal
warfare. Hiding among a friendly population, terrorists or guerrilla
fighters are difficult to locate by the advanced technical means
typical of SCW, while the increasing availability of advanced
personal weapons and other equipment, including a great variety
of communications systems and difficult to detect explosives,
increases their combat advantage.
Some observers (for example Martin Van Creveld) believe that guerrilla
warfare and terrorism will be even more prevalent in the future,
becoming the favored tactic among small ethnic groups and others.
Without taking a stand on this issue, it is clear that SCW is
largely irrelevant to this type of warfare.
The transformation of SCW capabilities into veritable RMAs is
a long process, constrained by the inertia of present warfare
style and force structure. It requires the resolution of various
problems, including integrating the many different systems involved
in SCW into a coherent whole. Also, the relative roles of airpower
vs. ground remain unresolved.
Depending on the mission, evolution paths may lead to different
configurations, some of which may be only more and better of the
same, i.e. not a RMA at all. For example, the current trend of
digitizing the battlefield involves no more than the search for
more effective ways of traditional war fighting. This approach
is by definition an incremental evolution and not a revolution.
However, the scenario of a light rapid deployment forces facing
heavy armor may lead to a RMA specifically designed for this type
of contingency.
The limitations of SCW in closed areas and against irregular forces
are significant, especially due to the reluctance against causalities
in the US and in other advanced countries. One American helicopter
shot down in Somalia was sufficient to cause the Americans to
leave. Indeed, even in cases of major national interest, such
as Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, there was considerable
resistance in the US to the war, almost until the outbreak of
Desert Storm. Thus, paradoxically, the weaker, who are ready to
accept and inflict heavy casualties and wide spread damage, are
often the stronger.
Real warfare, wherever it may take place, will remain bloody and
destructive. The dream that SCW based on precision firepower will
lead to clean, surgical war with little collateral damage and
minimal casualties will remain, in most cases, only a dream. Advanced
weapons and forces are often of little use without a readiness
to accept casualties.
The following diagram summarizes the balance of power situ. In
open areas advanced countries employing SCW will prevail over
less advanced countries fighting a traditional conventional war.
However, in closed areas, dominated by costly infantry combat
this advantage disappears. Portable advanced personal weapons,
easily available to guerrillas and terrorists, can blunt and defeat
attacks by sophisticated platforms when employed at short ranges.
In this kind of heavy casualties warfare, the weaker may often
prevail.
Israel faces, potentially or actually, various types of military
challenges: large scale regular war, guerrilla war, terrorism
and attacks on the rear civilian population. Thus, paraphrasing
the ancient Roman saying, "If you want peace, prepare for
all types of war." In large scale conventional war in open
areas, the Israel forces and their SCW capabilities are superior.
Hence, it is natural for the Arabs to resort to asymmetrical response,
i.e. guerrilla actions and terrorism.
Against guerrillas and regular forces fighting in closed terrain,
Israel must be able to field an infantry of high quality and motivation.
Such infantry must be nourished and preserved despite tendencies
towards the development of a small, sophisticated army. Attacks
on the home front, carried out by terrorists or indirect fire
(Katyushas, Scuds or other missiles), require the development
of means of defense. Even if these are fairly successful, the
luxury of a completely peaceful rear, which Israel was fortunate
to have enjoyed in many of its wars, has vanished. Hence, such
attacks on the rear, will cause considerable casualties and wide-spread
damage.
To sum up, Israel must be ready to face the realities of various
types of war. Such a challenge will persist in the perennially
unstable Middle East, even after comprehensive political solutions
have been achieved.
I. Eliot A. Cohen is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University and a member of the BESA Center's International Academic
Advisory Board.
*. Zeev Bonen was Director-General and later President of Rafael,
the Armaments Development Authority of the Israeli Ministry of
Defense, and is a Senior Research Associate at the BESA Center.
1. For a summary, see Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare,"
Foreign Affairs 75 (2) (March/April 1996): 3754.
2. One of the earliest American assessments of the Soviet view
was Notra Trulock, Kerry L. Hines, Anne D. Herr, "Soviet
Military Thought in Transition: Implications for the LongTerm
Military Competition," Pacific Sierra Research Corporation,
May 1988. A recent Russian view was Valdimir I. Slipchenko,
"A Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation,"
Field Artillery (October 1993): 3841. Ogarkov published
two short books in 1982 and 1985: see, in particular, N. V.
Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1985). A short summary of Soviet thinking can also be found in
M. A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze, Military Theorist (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1985; Washington, DC: PergamonBrassey's, 1988), a
work that deals as much with contemporary as historical issues.
3. See William A. Owens, "The Emerging System of Systems,"
Proceedings (May 1995): 3639.
4. Table slightly modified from ibid.
5. See Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation
and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991).
6. For a good example see Warren Caldwell, "Promises, Promises,"
Proceedings (January 1996): 5457.
7. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The BottomUp Review: An Assessment
(Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, 1994).
8. This has been my experience in polling a number of such audiences
over the last two years.
9. See Eliot A. Cohen, "Defending the Lucky Country,"
The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 5762.
10. A. J. Bacevich, "Just War II: Morality and High Technology,"
The National Interest 45 (Fall 1996): 37-47.
11. A.J. Echevarria, J.M. Shaw, "The New Military Revolution:
Post-Industrial Change," Parameters (Winter 1992/93):
70-79; M.J. Mazaar, The Military Technical Revolution (Washington,
DC: CSIS, 1993); D. Goure, "Is There a Military-Technical
Revolution in America's Future?" The Washington Quarterly
(Autumn 1993): 175-192.
12. D. Jablonsky, "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution
in Military Affairs," Parameters (Autumn 1994):18-36;
A.F. Krepinevich, Perspectives on the Revolution in Military
Affairs (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, April 24,
1995); A.F. Krepinevich, The Military Revolution: Restructuring
Defense for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Defense Budget
Project, May 5, 1995).
13. Z. Bonen, "Technology in War - Preliminary Lessons from
the Gulf War", in War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel
(Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992): 170-183.
14. C.K. Allard, "The Future of Command and Control: Toward
a Paradigm of Information Warfare", in Turning Point
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995): 161-192.
15. E.A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign
Affairs (January/February, 1994):.
16. W.K.Clark, "Digitization: Key to Landpower Dominance,"
Army (November, 1993): 28-33; J.W. Rigby, "The US
International Digitization Strategy," International Defense
Review (November, 1995): 28-32.
17. See note 4, and E.Mann, "Desert War, The First Information
War?" Airpower Journal (Winter 1994): 4-14; R. Szafranski,
"A Theory of Information Warfare, Preparing for 2020,"
Airpower Journal (Spring 1995): 56-65.
18. M. Hewish, R.Pengelley, "Pin Point Punch: Fibre-Optic
Missiles Promise Surgical Precision," International Defense
Review (March, 1996): 47, 49-50.
I. American Views of the Revolution II. Sophisticated Conventional War
in Military Affaris
Eliot A. Cohen Zeev Bonen
1. The Debate Over the Revolution 1. Introduction
in Military Affairs 2. The Microelectronics Revolution
2. #1 Owen's Disciples: and Sophisticated Conventional War
"The System of Systems" 3. SCW and Force Characteristics
3. #2 The Uncertain Revolutionaries 4. SCW, Post Cold War Missions
4. #3 The Gulf War Veterans and Rapid Deployment Forces
5. #4 The Skeptics 5. The Strategy of Weaker Countries
6. Consequences for the United States and Ethnic Groups
7. The Significance for Other Countries 6. War Against Civilian Populations
8. Notes 7. Conclusions
8. The Israeli Perspective
9. Notes
Precision Communications Sensors
strike4
SFW GCCS AWACS
JSOW MILSTAR RIVET JOINT
TLAM (BLK III) JSIPS EP3E
ATACMS/BAT DISN JSTARS
SLAM JUDI HASA
CALCM C4I FTW SBIR
HAVE NAP TADIL J TIER 2 (+)
AGM130 TRAP TIER 3 ()
HARM TACSAT TARPS/ATARS
GAIR HAWK JWICS MTI
SADARM MIDS REMBAS
HELLFIRE II SONET MAGIC LANTERN
TLAM (BLK IV) LINK 16 ISAR
JAVELIN DMS FDS
etc. etc. etc.
