Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East: 1998-99*
Gerald
M. Steinberg
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PART 1: WMD AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION DEVELOPMENTS
APPENDIX
The proliferation of non-conventional weapons in the Middle
East, as well as the broad range of arms control created to counter the
proliferation, are central elements in the structure of regional security. To
fully comprehend the dynamics and evolution of this structure, one must first
understand the interaction and cumulative impact of each of these factors on the
region.
Developments in
Iraq have a direct impact on Iranian perceptions and policies, while regional
events influence Israeli policymaking and decisions. Similarly, the developments
of specific weapons and limitation regimes -- nuclear, chemical, biological,
delivery systems, and even high-resolution commercial imaging satellites --are
closely interrelated.
In many of the academic analyses of these issues, each topic is explored
in depth, albeit separately. For
example, developments in Iraq are often considered independent of Iran, and the
regional aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are not combined with
chemical weapons issues. Security,
particularly in the Middle East, is indivisible, and “everything is connected
to everything”. As a result, in
addition to the WMD issues, this report also includes a section on the regional
implications of dual-use imaging satellites, and of the global land mine
convention. (However, this report does not include a section on the Biological
Weapons Treaty -- primarily because, in the absence of a verification regime,
its impact, both global and regional -- is still limited.)
The
goal of this report is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Middle East
weapons proliferation and arms control developments. The analysis is structured
as a “rolling text,” and is the first of a series of periodic reports
providing updates of regional developments.
In 1991, the chances of preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles in the Middle East
appeared to be enhanced by the results of the Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq.
During this period, the region was filled with hope following the
convening of the Madrid Middle East peace conference and the creation of the
multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). The
terms of the cease fire agreement, as embodied in UN Security Council Resolution
687, included the verified destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,
related technologies and facilities, delivery systems (ballistic missiles), and
the creation of a long-term monitoring system to insure that Iraq stayed “WMD-
and missile-free”. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) – an
extraordinary institution with unprecedented powers to undertake highly
intrusive on-site inspections – was created.
Although UNSCOM's work began more slowly than anticipated, it seemed
that within a few months all of the suspected facilities would be identified,
and any remaining weapons would be destroyed.
Unfortunately,
as the decade drew to a close, the potential for regional agreements and
limitations seemed very small. The UNSCOM experience clearly demonstrates that
even with the most intrusive inspection and verification systems in the history
of arms control, closed totalitarian states and regimes are capable of
concealing weapons and facilities for many years. These developments have
undermined the foundation for Middle East arms control.
Iran
has become another major factor in the regional proliferation process . In the
early part of the decade, China and North Korea appeared to be Iran's major
suppliers for WMD and missile technology and expertise.
However, in the past few years, exports from Russia have assumed the
central role. Efforts led by the United States to slow or halt the flow of
dual-use and military technology and expertise have intensified, to end these
exports from Russia.
Other
countries in the region, including Syria and Egypt, have also made moves to
strengthen their WMD and missile capabilities.
In addition to the large arsenals of chemical weapons possessed by both
states, and ballistic missile capabilities that have slowly increased, evidence
of renewed efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities is increasing.
Political
developments in the region provide the backdrop for many of these developments,
and have an important impact on arms acquisition, as well as on the results of
arms control efforts. For example,
the limited progress in the ACRS process, which was frozen in 1994, and has not
yet been revived, was directly related to overarching political conditions and
the fragile state of the Middle East “peace process” in particular.
This report presents the developments in arms control and non-proliferation in the Middle East as took place towards the end of the last decade, focusing on 1998-1999. 1998 and 1999 were not exceptional years for Middle East arms control and proliferation, but rather, were typical in many ways; the evolution of the central issues discussed was generally a continuation of developments in the past decade. As this report highlights, this is precisely the problem. Despite all the efforts to change the direction of these developments, very little seems to be changing, and the acquisition of destabilizing weapons continues.