WATER AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
When reading the literature, one cannot help thinking that more ink has flown writing articles on water in the Middle East than the water actually flowing through it. And just as water flows through states with radically different interests and perspectives on the issue, so does the meaning of the ink flowing in these articles pull in vastly different directions. Two extreme views characterize much of the literature: water will lead to war, or water will be the basis of a Messiah-like peace, where the lion (usually the upper riparian state) will live with the lamb (usually the lower riparian state). The virtues of such a dichotomous literature are clear. The state (from what this author feels to be Israel's national security interests) would do well to stick to the Aristotelian/Maimonidian golden path.
This is the key lesson to be drawn from the works of the three best researchers on the subject, Miriam Lowi, Arnon Soffer and Tony Allan. Lowi's excellent book (Lowi, 1995) effectively negates the idea that water can be what coal and steel presumably were to European integration. In other words, when fundamental political issues are still in contention, there cannot be one iota of hope to strike a cooperative deal, unless the states are lower riparians, and the relatively stronger party in the dyad derives a relatively higher advantage from any cooperation. To those familiar with international relations paradigms, Lowi's chapter comparing water regimes in four shared water-basins offers devastating evidence against liberal and functional perspectives. She writes:
Based on the experiences in four international river basins, the central argument of our study can be restated thus: when a riparian dispute in an arid region unfolds within the context of a more comprehensive political conflict, the former cannot be effectively isolated from the latter. Limited agreement on sharing water resources cannot be attained, largely because the least needy and/or most powerful state will derive little benefit from cooperating and relinquishing its most favorable position. Instead, it [meaning Syria] will use political conflict and, implicitly, the concern for relative gains, as the justification for non-cooperation. In contrast, the neediest and least powerful riparian will seek a cooperative arrangement [in our case Jordan], despite the larger conflict, because it has little, if any, alternative. When it is successful - and this happens only when the dominant power in the basin has been induced to cooperate for one reason or another - the arrangement is specifically to the task and cannot be viewed as an avenue toward political settlement.
Lowi dismisses the possibility of large scale water cooperation, and vindicates the realist perspective:
In sum, in the international river basins we have studied, a variant of the theory of hegemonic stability holds true. In all cases, outcomes reflect the distribution of power. Cooperation is not achieved unless the dominant power accepts it, or has been induced to do so by an external power. The Hegemon will only cooperate if 1) it has critical need and 2) is not an upstream riparian.
She proves time and again that in water basins shared by contestants fighting over other even more essential issues, one's position towards water is calculated rationally, taking both security and economic considerations into account and lest one forget, in that specific order. This is indeed the perspective that most riparian states have taken. Unfortunately, the rationality of these actors is part of the problem, not of its solution.
At this point, where realism brings actors to a grinding halt, Allan offers interesting insights (Allan, 1996). Technology and economics can be brought to bear, if not to solve the water problem for any particular state, since Allan is not addressing the power implications of water per se, at least in attenuating its impact. Technology is responsible for productive efficiency defined as getting a greater yield from a unit of water. Allowing the market to set a market price achieves allocative efficiency, the economic savings of which might be even more considerable than those derived from productive efficiency.
The present article assumes that Israel must continue to regard water as a resource that not only provides sustenance for life itself, but also enhances the State's political and strategic power. However, Israel, as a technologically advanced state, can take economic and technological changes into consideration to relent on the need to use water as a means of asserting its power or to use undue force to maintain its present share of water. The article is divided into three parts. The first describes and analyzes Israel's water environment in the wider regional context. The second part covers the positions, demands, efforts and claims on water resources by the three neighboring states: Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority (PA). In the third part, these claims are analyzed in light of Israel's interests, the State's present positions on these issues, and an attempt is made again, where relevant, to propose revisions and new perspectives to address these positions.
Israel's Overall Water Environment
Israel's regional water environment is determined by two essential factors – availability of resources relative to needs and control over water resources. How one relates to these basic dimensions is highly contested in the literature. The literature is sharply divided on the problem of availability, like much of the literature on development in general, between what can be called the neo-Malthusian school and the capitalist entrepreneurial or demand-management approach. The former stresses the growing scarcity of water resources, whereas the latter emphasizes human ingenuity to make so much more of existing resources, or if that is not feasible, to come up with viable alternatives. David Landes, a well known economic historian, describes the two schools of thought. The first school focuses on bellies (or more appropriately in an article on water, parched throats) and the second on the growing number of good brains that can come up with ingenious solutions to problems facing humanity (Landes, 1998).
Almost every article on Israel's overall water environment begins with a description demonstrating the growing absolute scarcity of water for Israel and its neighbors. Two basic facts contribute to an inevitably graver situation: a static water supply and a growing demand for water by a rapidly increasing population. Even propitious trends such as higher standards of living have, at least in the past, increased demands on water. Israel, for example, reached its maximum utilization potential by the mid 1970s, when it consumed 1.6 million cubic meters (MCM) (Allan, 1996). Since then it has resorted to over-utilization of underground aquifers and non-replenishable resources that have led to salination and therefore deterioration of these important water resources (Zaslavsly, 1999). It should be pointed out that underground water accounts for over forty per cent of Israel's water supply. The problem is gravest in Israel's largest aquifer, the coastal aquifer. This aquifer parallels and is frequently located directly beneath Israel's heavily populated central zone where over-utilization causes ruinous seawater infiltration. However, it is also serious in the mountain aquifer. Paradoxically, Israel's sophisticated water system magnifies this deleterious impact. The aquifers most affected are those that make a major contribution to the overall system, partially because they are located in the middle of a water-carrier system that conveys water from the relatively more abundant north to the semi-arid southern area of Israel. The scarcity problem is still graver in Jordan, where it was responsible for the resignation of ministers and at least one change of government.
Water scarcity may, however, be relative, not absolute. The first good reason is what Allan describes as the growing availability of virtual water – water-intensive agricultural products that can be imported from water-abundant countries at much lower prices than can be produced locally. In fact, Middle East countries, by increasing food imports, derived two-fold benefits. They imported food at relatively cheap prices, and those prices were especially cheap due to subsidization of costs in the producing countries. Unfortunately, with the WTO regime in place, subsidization of agriculture in producing countries has declined and the relative prices of products, mainly wheat, have subsequently increased (Allan, 1996). Importing wheat, for example, is like importing water. The second and intimately related good reason is the fact that agriculture in the Third World is responsible for 70 per cent of the water consumption. Approximately 21 per cent are consumed by industry and eight per cent by the people themselves. Increasing imports and reducing agriculture is a long-term solution to the water problem that is far more efficient than creating water. The situation is similar for Israel. The third reason has to do with technological abilities. There is no doubt that the world is exhibiting an overall increasing ability to solve acute problems scientifically, technologically and through greater social efficiency. Proof of this universal long-term tendency can be deduced by greater longevity despite rapid demographic growth. People are living longer at higher levels of consumption. Part of this process is the ability to use scarce resources more efficiently and diversely. Oil is a good example. During the oil crisis, oil was viewed similarly to the way the water problem is viewed in the Middle East today – a problem of absolute scarcity that will result in economic dislocation and perhaps even war. It no doubt did the latter, but Iraq's invasion was not due to growing demand and rising prices but on the contrary, to oil glut and low prices. Neo-Malthusians were surprised to discover that both supply and demand of oil proved elastic, due to the growing efficiency in its use as a result of technological advances. The terms of trade or relative prices of oil therefore decreased by 30 per cent between 1974 at the height of the oil crisis and the late 1990s. Saudi Arabia, the swing producer of oil, has respect for the ability of advanced economies to utilize science in order to come up with solutions to save on oil, come up with alternatives (albeit not so relevant for water), and increase output. To reduce the incentive to do any of the three, the swing producer usually acts to moderate oil prices.
Allan suggests that water is not much different from oil. Officials in the Israeli Treasury Department and the Bank of Israel share his viewpoint. From their perspective, Israel has to privatize water production and distribution and leave pricing to the market. This would force agriculture, the chief water consumer, towards water-shy crops employing technology where Israel has a comparative advantage and towards the production and sale of agricultural know-how or else to suffer a natural economic death. Israeli agriculture would go the way of the coal industry in northern Europe. Urban and industrial consumers and municipalities in turn would be forced to buy existing technologies in order to reduce water consumption, lay down artificial grass and plant low water-consuming plants in their gardens and so on. Put simply, a free water economy would solve the so-called water problem. In fact, as far as most Treasury officials are concerned, the problem is not water but distortions in the economy. Israeli policy-makers, influenced by free-market ideology inherent in globalization, have taken many steps in this direction with indeed not insignificant results. Water consumption peaked in 1985-6 at 2,000 MCM and declined by twenty per cent on average since, despite rapid growth in Israel's population and despite a substantial increase in the standard of living. Agricultural water consumption has been reduced by 400 MCM. To achieve these results, real water prices were raised. More of essentially the same would bring even greater gains, according to Treasury Department and Bank of Israel officials. Not only would there be productive efficiency (in the production and distribution of water through technology), but also allocative efficiency (Allan, 1996).
Yet, as suggested in the opening of the article, Lowi's political perspective counsels caution as to whether such allocative efficiency, namely the reduction of agriculture, can be so easily achieved, not so much as a result of internal political opposition but due to security considerations. Israel's water environment is also affected by security concerns and coping with some of its challenges may justify deviation from economically optimal policies. The external political problems - in Arab strategic discourse it is frequently called food security - will be addressed in the subsequent sections. Water, however, may also touch on internal security and operate, as so often is the case, in different and in fact diametrically opposite directions. The importance of water to Israeli internal security is indirect and is intimately linked to agriculture and the control of land and space, especially in peripheral and border areas. Free market policies have in the past and inevitably will in the future, imply a small agricultural sector if not in volume or added value, certainly in the space and number of local (as opposed to imported) manpower required. The overwhelming majority of space in peripheral and border areas is populated, if at all, by the same agricultural settlements that have characterized settlement since the founding of the Zionist movement. Even with the increase in the middle-class suburbanization and ex-urbanization patterns, there is no viable alternative, at least in the short-term, to agricultural settlements when it comes to the space they control relative to their numbers in many parts of the country (Soffer, 1999).
Meanwhile the need for spatial control in order to achieve security has, if anything, increased rather than diminished as demonstrated by the recent events surrounding the Al-Aqsa Intifada. But well before that, areas contiguous to the former Green Line on the other side have become increasingly populated, a pattern that reversed trends during Jordanian rule when these areas were depopulated as locals migrated eastward. The Israeli economy spurred growth in areas closest to the Israeli market place. Jewish settlement is important in thwarting the encroachment and alienation of land in the absence of a formal border. The problem is not as acute from Hadera south to the Petach-Tikva area, due to heavy Jewish urbanization that has reached the former Green Line itself. The situation is more problematic in the Iron Valley (Wadi Ara) area, which is characterized by rapid demographic growth of both Arab Israeli villages and their West Bank counterparts.
These considerations so far justify the continued subsidization of agriculture, including perhaps the water input. Such a policy of course flies in the face of both market economy policies as well as water conservation. If this analysis is correct it also means that a link exists between internal security considerations of water and external considerations. Less water conservation to subsidize agricultural settlements also means that Israel can less afford to be flexible in giving up its share of water.
However, there are also considerations in the other direction. Most agricultural labor today is imported. The settlements employ either foreigners or Palestinians from the territories. Many actually reside within the Green Line, as in the recent uproar over such tin housing serving the Palestinian workers in Tamra and their families. Officials estimate that there are at least 30,000 Palestinian agricultural workers who reside in Israel on a more or less permanent basis. A paradoxical situation emerges. On the one hand, agricultural settlement is important to stave off effective land alienation. On the other hand, the subsidization of agriculture also leads to rural squatting by Palestinians across the Green Line. Policy makers have to weigh both sides of the dilemma, look for ways to alleviate it and if not found, decide which long-term goal will best serve Israel.
The water-agricultural nexus continues to be ideologically important. Agricultural land perpetuates the link between the collectivity and the soil (Sherman, 2000). It is true that cultivating ties to the land through leisure pursuits such as hiking and trekking and mobilization over environment issues offers a partial alternative. Nevertheless, there is value in perpetuating a sector around which many national myths continue to exist.
Finally, according to Dan Zaslavsky, even if Israel would effectively scrap most of its agriculture it would hardly solve its absolute and increasing water deficit. He estimates that this deficit, which at present stands at 500 MCM (derived from the difference between present consumption levels and aquifer and surface water recharge rates and water necessary to reduce salination), is augmented yearly by approximately 35 MCM. This means that by 2020, the deficit will reach 2,000 MCM. This is substantially more than the annual available water yield (Zaslavsky, 2001). An increasing share of this deficit is due to the salination of existing waters as a result of over-exploitation leading in effect to a decrease in the absolute amounts of available water. Thus, while consumption in Israel is increasing, the absolute quantity of available water is shrinking. Scrapping most of Israeli agriculture would, at most, cover half of the deficit projected for 2020.
Neither are technological solutions so easy to implement. Recycled water is limited and ecologically problematic. If agriculture on any large scale will continue, it will also necessitate high conveyor costs from the urban milieu from which it draws its sources to the periphery areas where it will be consumed. It is also important to remember that no conveyor system exists to transfer the water saved by agriculture to other uses. Desalination plants look more promising, and for this reason, five plants are planned. However, they too are problematic. Ecologically, they are highly energy-intensive and polluting. Were they to be used to close the deficit, they would be likely to consume up to 15 per cent of Israel's total energy bill and expose Israel to sanctions should a world-wide emissions control regime come into existence (Sherman, 2000). Strategically, desalination plants are of course much more vulnerable to attack than control and access to existing aquifers.
Controlling Water Resources
It is important to realize that as much as Israel would treat water as an economic commodity it could probably never achieve the savings it needed if it did not have control and actual use of most of the existing resources it utilizes today. The basic problem facing Israel is that the continuation of the peace process will almost inevitably lead to deterioration in Israel's control over present water resources, and most probably to considerable reductions in the amounts of water it will be able to draw. The water issue is therefore comparable to the more central issues of control of land and space. At best, one secures intangible peace treaties at the cost of giving up tangible resources and the control that ensures their continuous use. From the narrow perspective on water, the peace process inevitably means major concessions over the amounts of water Israel will be able to use as well as decreased assurance that they will, in fact, be forthcoming. To understand the basic water cost of continuing the peace process it is necessary to explain Israel's basic water ecology and the history of control over its water resources.
Before 1967, Israel had total control of two of the five major sources of stored or flowing water in the area. These included the coastal aquifer, the largest single source, and the Dan River, one of the three tributaries that flow into the Sea of Galilee. The other two sources of the Upper Jordan, the Hasbani and the Banias water springs, originated in Lebanese and Syrian sovereign territory, respectively. The fourth source of water source flowing into the Jordan River basin along its southern extremity, the Yarmuk River, acts for much of its course as the border between Jordan and Syria (Hof, 1997). Aquifers are another important source of water. A sizeable amount of water originates in the West Bank's western aquifer. However, its discharge is located almost exclusively within Israel, where it becomes the Yarkon River headwaters. Another aquifer flowing northeast from the West Bank discharges in springs located well within Israel.
Despite lack of control over the sources flowing into Israel, the young state enjoyed almost complete use of their waters, albeit at substantial political and military cost (Lowi, 1995). Jordan was both too militarily weak and too technologically underdeveloped to utilize these sources. Lebanon, with its vast resources, made only limited use of Hasbani waters. Both states were nonetheless compelled to join forces with the Arab states in contesting Israeli efforts at diversion of the Jordan River basin waters into Israel's water carrier, which was completed in 1965. Fortunately for Israel, only Syria was prepared to engage in actual military hostilities to thwart this project. A vast literature exists analyzing the extent to which Israel's successful water diversion project and Arab efforts to prevent its implementation were responsible for the accelerated military escalation that led to the Six-Day War. That war's outcome, as in so many other areas, enhanced Israel's degree of control over the water sources and their amounts. From that time on, Israel has controlled the Banias springs, located in the northern part of the Golan. Any peace process can only leave Israel worse off, provided one avoids accepting the tempting but deluding conviction that rational cooperation over a joint river basin management is possible. To gauge the extent of concessions Israel must make, this article analyzes basic Palestinian and Syrian demands in addition to analyzing the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and the problems it has encountered since then.
Syrian Claims: Despite Syria's relatively favorable water situation, water remains a key issue in the negotiations between the two states. Its salience is due to two basic factors. The first and most predominant factor is the close intermeshing between territorial claims and control over water, which although perhaps being marginal to Syria's overall needs, are nevertheless vitally important to Israel. The second concerns Syria's own water needs. Syria's share of Euphrates water has decreased considerably, to a point where it can no longer be considered a state with abundant water resources. In the southeastern part, including Damascus and the areas bordering the Golan, it is in fact water-parched (Zaslavsky, 1999). The linkage between control of water and territorial claims is at the heart of the political controversy between these two states. The latest round of talks between Israel and Syria during the Barak administration presumably failed over the future border between the two states. Israel was willing to withdraw to the borders as defined by the 1923 treaty that delineated the borders of the government of Palestine (Hof, 1997). Syria demanded recognition of “the line of 4 June 1967” in which the upper course of the Jordan River served as the de facto boundary between Syria and Israel, even though the river fell entirely within British Mandate Palestine. Acceptance of this border would also mean loss of control and use of Yarmuk waters. The 1923 line included the Palestinian village of al-Hamma or Hamat Gader, where diversion currently takes place.
Worse still for Israel, acceptance of the 1967 line and the implied contested nature of the demilitarized zones, enables Syria to claim the Sea of Galilee as its border with Israel. In contradistinction, the 1923 Mandate boundary placed the lake entirely within Palestine, albeit with the line being a mere 10 meters off the high water mark along its northeastern shore. Moreover, Syria, by virtue of an Anglo-French “Good Neighborly Relations” accord signed between the two Mandatory powers in 1926 that allowed Syrian fishermen access to the lake, might demand internationalization of the Sea of Galilee (Hof, 1997). Such an outcome would have grave consequences on Israeli control of water. Lowi consistently demonstrates the weakness of lower riparian states in shared water basins. Offsetting Israel's weakness as a lower riparian is its advantage as the water storage state for Jordan and the Palestinians. The internationalization of this lake would seriously weaken Israel's position in controlling and utilizing a critical resource.
Syria might also claim a small share of Israel's water resources based on the Jordan Valley (“Johnston”) Plan. Eric Johnston, an envoy of President Eisenhower, attempted to create a regional authority in 1954-5 based on the cooperation of the states involved in the Jordan River basin that would allocate and manage water resources in the most rational and beneficial manner possible. Regarding Syria, he incorporated the recommendations of the Arab League's Technical Committee and allocated 20 MCM to Syria from the Banias River for local irrigation and 22 MCM from the upper Jordan River to service an area near the Boteiha Farms in Syrian territory near the Sea of Galilee. The Plan also envisioned “A new diversion structure and canal from the Jordan River to Boteiha Farm in Syria, together with 50 KW of electric power to replace water power” (Hof, 1997). At the time, the proximity of the Banias spring, only one kilometer away from the 1923 border yet within the disputed DMZ (demilitarized zone), prevented the allocation of 20 MCM to Syria. Nor did the Syrians ever demand or utilize the 22 MCM for the Boteiha Farm area, lest it be perceived as cooperating with Israel in accordance with the Johnston plan. Though this demand has been sanctioned by an American-led mediation effort whose validity and relevance has at times been upheld by Israel, it is complicated by Syria's violation of another facet of the same plan. It has been drawing 220 MCM annually from the Yarmuk River, mostly at Jordan's expense. This is considerably more than the 90 MCM allocated it by the Johnston plan (Haddadin, 2000). Even more problematic for Syria, Johnston's plan adopted the amount recommended by the Arab League Technical Committee in which Syria was a member and to whose authority it clearly conceded. This may be the reason why “Syria has not taken a public stance regarding the plan during the peace negotiations. Assuming it regains the Golan Heights, it would probably rest its demands, as upstream riparians usually do, on its sizeable contribution to the system” (Emulsa, 1996). This position would also be problematic, since Syria, which might be an upper riparian regarding Jordan, is a lower riparian with respect to Turkey and the much more important Euphrates River waters.
Even if Syria were to agree to the 1923 borders and make no claims on water that had already reached the Jordan River basin, problems would arise from Israel's very withdrawal. Assuring the continuous flow of the bulk of Banias water into the basin would be one problem. The Banias, one of the three principal sources of the Jordan River, was originally allotted to the Palestine Mandate by the 1920 Anglo-French Convention. However, it wound up being located one kilometer inside Syria when the border was brought into legal force in 1923. It provides 120 MCM, or approximately 20 percent, of the Jordan River flow as it enters the Sea of Galilee. Israel might insist on an unrestricted flow to Israeli territory. However, Syria is likely to refuse making such a commitment (Hof, 1997).
Water storage infrastructure, developed over the years in the Golan to provide water for Israeli settlements, poses two problems for Israel, although it is a boon to Syria. Israeli-built reservoirs have been able to trap between 40 and 50 MCM of winter floodwaters annually for use by Israeli settlements (Hof, 1997). Prior to 1967, much of this water found its way during the winter months to tributaries and into the Sea of Galilee. Syria could conceivably demand 20 to 30 MCM more in the future. Israel will also be concerned about the prospects of polluted run-off water into Israel's national system, especially in the face of Syrian plans for mass settlement in the area (Sherman, 2000).
Palestinian Claims: Palestinian claims are an even more daunting challenge for Israel, even though it may be argued that unlike the Syrian case, the mechanisms for finding a solution and monitoring them already exist. These emerged as a result of article 40 of the September 1995 agreement, which extended Palestinian Authority rule to six of the major towns in the West Bank and in which Israel, for the very first time, formally recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. Their specification and extent, however, were deferred to the final-status talks that were to terminate on September 13, 1998. The agreement established the Joint Water Committee (JWC), in which both sides would cooperate and coordinate over the use of water resources and sewage in the West Bank. The agreement accords each side equal presentation and veto power in meeting the JWC's mandate (Rouyer, 1999). That included cover licensing of new wells and other water installations, monitoring and adjusting extraction quotas from all water sources in the territory, and planning the construction of new water and sewage systems. Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETS) composed of representatives from Israeli and Palestinian water agencies were responsible for monitoring compliance with the committee's decisions and quota assignments.
Article 40 also obligated Israel to relinquish control as well as water resources. According to its provisions, the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza was to receive 28.6 MCM annually in additional water for domestic use during the interim period mandate (Rouyer, 1999). One-third of that amount was to be provided by Israel from its own sources, to be sold at commercial rates of which 5 MCM were to go to Gaza. The bulk of additional water was to come from the drilling of new wells in the largely unutilized eastern aquifer. Both sides agreed that the Palestinians in the West Bank would need between 70 and 80 MCM annually in the near future for both domestic and agricultural use.
Israel and the PA even achieved a modicum of cooperation. However, as the breakdown of negotiations at Camp David and the subsequent outbreak of violence at the end of October 2000 so conclusively prove, mechanisms for conflict resolution and even cooperation over managing conflict are no substitute for negotiations and arriving at an agreement over actual substantive issues. Cooperation over water, however, continued even during the Intifada (Kantor, 2001).
From the Israeli point of view the Palestinian demands are overwhelming. The PA claims to be heir to half of the share water from the Jordan River basin allotted to Jordan by the Johnston unified water plan. This includes 50 MCM of water flowing from the northern tributaries and 100 MCM flowing from the Yarmuk (Ka'wash, 1999). In an interview during the Camp David talks, Fadil Ka'wash, the vice-head of the PWA, claimed that the Palestinians were entitled to 250 MCM of the Jordan River basin waters (Daghaimah, 2000). The PA expressed public dismay that the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, despite being signed after the birth of the PA, did not take Palestinian interests into account but chose to be silent over the over-exploitation of Yarmuk waters by the Syrians. Different demands are voiced by different people and agencies concerning water from the aquifers. Eighty to ninety per cent of these waters are regarded as Palestinian water. A study by the PLO's National and International Relations Department entitled “Israel's Looting of the Palestinian Water Resources” claims that 80 to 90 percent of the water Israel utilizes is stolen (Al-Ifranji, 2000). By that yardstick Israel would be required to give up 400 MCM from the western and northeastern sources alone. Ka'wash, slightly more generous, considered all eastern basin water, part of which is used at present by Jewish settlements (see Table), to belong to the Palestinian entity. Regarding the western and northeastern aquifers, he invoked “the principle of fair water-sharing for the two parties”, arguing that “this is a well known principle in international law” (Daghaimah, 2000). A claim to half of the amount of water, approximately 240 MCM, would be a conservative estimate of Palestinian intentions over these waters. Jad Isaac, the director general of a research institute affiliated to Al-Quds University, argues that water consumption between Israel and the Palestinians should be based on equal per capita shares. According to his formula, Israel would have to give up nearly 600 MCM of water (Isaac, 2000). Thus, fulfillment of even the minimum Palestinian demands would entail an annual loss of approximately 400 MCM or 25 per cent of Israel's available surface and stored water resources. This is at least three times the amount Israel would jeopardize by giving up the Golan Heights. (The estimated amount of water is not the sum of the three demands because presumably part of the Yarmuk resources would not necessarily be debited only from Israel's account but would include Syria as well). Reductions of this magnitude, as Soffer has written, “would oblige the government of Israel to embark on the drastic curtailment of Israeli agriculture” or maybe even its death knell (Soffer, 1998).
Water Allocation by Aquifer According to the September 28, 1995 Agreement (in MCM) (Van Edig, 1999)
Palestinians mean what they say. This is the conclusion that can be drawn from Julie Trottier's study of Palestinian water politics, which is the most extensive published study on the subject to date. The PA, faced with two alternative water strategies – either developing a comprehensive centralized water system (that does not, however, rule out private initiative), or maintain existing inefficiencies and augment demands against Israel as a form of “liberation” strategy – has clearly chosen the latter. By 1999 the PA, according to Trottier, had failed to take any serious measures in developing a comprehensive water system that she describes as nothing less than “water anarchy” (Trottier, 2000). Rouyer in an otherwise optimistic article on cooperation over water between Israel and the Palestinians confirms this state of affairs:
By the end of 1998, the National Water Council (NWC - the highest policy making forum on water composed of ministers and water experts, set up in 1996) had yet to formally meet. The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) is administered by a chairman (Nabil Sharif) based in Gaza City and deputy chairman (Fadil Ka'wash) whose office is in Ramallah in the West Bank. Both men are political appointees from Tunis. The PWA is projected to include four separate departments, Water Resources and Planning, Regulatory, Technical and Administrative. These departments are evolving, and job descriptions are in the process of being developed and formalized (Rouyer, 1999).
Elsewhere he writes:
Another area where the PA has been slow to initiate new rules has been the regulatory function of the PWA. In the Gaza Strip, there have been practically no restrictions on drilling new wells, even though they are further depleting an already over-utilized aquifer. In the West Bank, water quotas and permits established under the occupation remain in effect. Even in Area A (land under complete PA control) the PWA has not raised water utilization licenses. The PWA firmly supports the use of water meters and permit quotas to protect water resources from over-exploitation, but no PA law to that effect has been promulgated or new rules put into practice (Rouyer, 1999).
Nor can Israel expect of the Palestinians, in the short-term at least, the type of economic diversification necessary to reduce agriculture and therefore overall water consumption. Such a process, if it materializes at all, takes many years of stability and maturation in the state-building process. In the early years of statehood the village, and therefore agriculture, have symbolic importance Palestinians will be unable to give up. Finally, much of the decline in agriculture and subsequent proletarianization of the Palestinian labor force was related to employment in Israel. Yet, since the first Intifada those employed within Israel as a percentage of the total work force in Gaza and the West Bank has declined. Agriculture is regarded as a partial, albeit inadequate, substitute to work in Israel and therefore reduces the prospects of achieving allocative efficiency in the near future. It can therefore be assumed that not only will Palestinian domestic consumption increase as a result of population increase, but so will agricultural water consumption.
Israeli-Jordanian Relations over Water
Ostensibly, all water issues between Israel and Jordan have been effectively resolved in the Wadi Araba Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty signed in October 1994. In addressing future solutions concerning increasingly pressing water problems, former Jordanian Water and Irrigation Minister, Dr. Mundhir Haddadin, in an academic article on water issues, hardly mentions Israel (Haddadin, 2000). Instead, he discusses ways to augment water resources through treatment and reuse of wastewater, technology transfer, use of fossil water, and of course the politically problematic issue of shifting and reducing allocations from agriculture.
Yet even in this moderate and professional article, there are at least three indications why water issues might remain problematic. The first has to do with sheer need and the high financial resources necessary to augment these resources. When Jordan became a Kingdom in 1946, the ratio between total resources and population was highly favorable, at 3,000 MCM per capita. Half a century later, it has to make due with one-twentieth that amount per capita in an area of which 92 per cent is classified as arid and much of the remainder suffers from fluctuating rainfall. The second is the explanation for the steep population increase. Most Jordanians blame the creation of the State of Israel and the subsequent departure of over half the Palestinian population as the key factor behind steep population growth (Haddadin, 2000). Finally, Johnston's unified Jordan Valley Plan remains part of the Jordanian discontent. In Haddadin's own words:
The other side of the equation, i.e., the resource side, witnessed a decrease due to the trespassing of the neighbors against Jordan's water shares in the international watercourse. Israel trespassed against Jordan's share in the Yarmuk and the Jordan River, and Syria against Jordan's share in the Yarmuk. Prior to Israel's diversion of the Jordan River in 1964, Jordan had been using some of the river's water to irrigate about 6,800 hectares in the Jordan Valley. The Kingdom's rights on the Jordan were finally settled in 1955 to be 100 MCM to be drawn from Lake Tiberias to irrigate the Ghor, which was then an integral part of the Kingdom. Since the diversion of the river in 1964, this share was never released by Israel. On the Yarmuk, the state of war with Israel did not allow the construction of a major dam on the Yarmuk to help provide Jordan with 377 MCM of water from that river. It further did not allow the construction of a diversion weir across the river to divert the Yarmuk water into the King Abdallah Canal in the Jordan Valley. This political hardship limited Jordan's use of the Yarmuk to about 110 MCM per year, less than one-third of its rightful share. The rest of its share was trespassed against by Israel (50 MCM) and Syria (130 MCM), and the balance of about 87 MCM kept flowing as floods toward the Jordan River and the Dead Sea (Haddadin, 2000).
Simply put, when Haddadin looked at the future he coped with the Jordanian water problem within the parameters of the peace treaty. When he looks at the past, however, he describes what from his and most Jordanians' perspective was a very unjust chapter of history, the impact of which extends into the future. Fortunately, the article ends with a look into the future. However, it must be realized that the past sometimes returns to haunt the future. This may be why the Jordanian press and public place Israeli-Jordanian water issues under strict scrutiny and are quick to fault its water policies and commitments. One of the most consistent criticisms relates to the lack of any tangible movement towards augmenting Jordan's water resources by 100 MCM annually, as stipulated in the treaty.
What Should or Can Israel's Policy Be?
To put it bluntly, not very generous. The upper riparian rule Lowi discovers on the basis of a study of four international systems, the Jordan River basin in particular, and confirmed by Soffer, alerts us to the fact that cooperation over management and allocation of water is a delusion. Control is essential in order to avoid diversion of water and reduce the damage wrought by pollution. Syria and the Palestinians may be expected to make deliberate efforts to deny Israel's share of water in any agreement. Pollution may occur more as a result of costs they will not want to bear, mere negligence, or lack of know-how to deal with the problem. It can be expected that Israel will have some leverage with the Palestinians, at least in the immediate period after the signing of an agreement, because of Israel's present role of water provider. Yet, as we know from the international constraints imposed on Israeli action in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, water is hardly a leverage tool even in making the Palestinians honor their agreement, even if it involves tit for tat on water issues.
Nor should Israel necessarily compromise strategic control for either technological solutions regarding the supply of water, or allocative efficiency governing its usage. The rewards of allocative efficiency must be weighed against competing benefits and values. Withdrawal will intensify conflict over the control of land within the Green Line, thus increasing the importance of agriculture in ensuring state control over land. This goal could arguably be achieved by suburbanization and ex-urbanization with the necessary infrastructure financed by the economic savings derived from subsidizing agriculture, a point this author believes requires study. So far the results have not been encouraging. If Israel does take this route it should ensure or at least weigh the impact that reduction of Israeli agriculture might have on the PA in increasing agricultural production and therefore, water consumption amongst the Palestinians. Even on this point, it might be in Israel's interests to forsake water interests in developing comparative specialization between the two economies and hopefully some interdependence between the two, rather than “internationalize” its food market by importing world-wide in order to attain full market benefits.
Regarding technological solutions such as wide-scale desalination, they are not addressed to substitute for the loss of 25 to 60 per cent in water resources as a result of agreements between Israel and its neighbors. Rather, they are intended to deal with the problem of absolute scarcity at present and future levels of consumption. This deficit is calculated on the basis of continued control of water resources before the anticipated withdrawals. At present, solving this accumulative deficit alone seems illusionary. Burdening Israel with further obligations stemming from another round of “peace” agreements would place solving the augmented deficit completely within the realm of science fiction. As Sherman rightly points out, demand for water in Israel is not only inelastic, but high water consumption is also necessary to provide the lifestyle that justifies the sacrifice citizens make to Israel's security (Sherman, 2000).
The most Israel should offer Palestinians is a graduated increase of water conditional on two criteria. First, increments of water should be linked to increasing efficiency in water conveyance and distribution. At present, Palestinians are wasting almost half the water in the distribution process. Second, increments will only be provided if the PA achieves economic growth according to a formula that correlates between its urban standard of living and use of water.
Water can only be one of many considerations in reaching peace agreements with either the Palestinians or Syria. The only thing the author of this article can say is that water seems to provide one more reason not to make peace with Syria. It is, however, hardly the straw that can break the camel's back. Any significant withdrawal, let alone the loss of the Golan, will in any case seriously endanger Israel's existence in the long term.
References:
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