MAPPING THE FUTURE:
NEW STUDIES CONSIDER OSLO III AND THE RISKS OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

Under the terms of the Oslo II accord between Israel and the Palestinian authority, Israel is supposed to make additional "interim withdrawals" from undefined parts of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in the fall. "Final status" talks about the long-term disposition of the territories are inevitable, as well. "It's time, therefore, to take a serious look at core Israeli interests in these areas, and how to defend them", says BESA Center director Prof. Efraim Inbar.

Two new, in-depth BESA Center studies tackle the subject: "Mapping Israeli Interests Towards Further Redeployment in Judea and Samaria" by geographer and hydrologist Dr. Haim Gvirtzman; and "The Risks of Palestinian Statehood" by BESA Center strategists Inbar and Shmuel Sandler.

Oslo II Accord (PA areas A in brown; areas B in yellow)

 

Gvirtzman skillfully layers Israeli military, demographic and water interests atop existing political "facts-on-the-ground" created by Oslo II, and presents a detailed plan for 'acceptable' further Israeli redeployments. His original mapping has drawn widespread attention in Israel, since it is the first to mesh the various domains of strategic concern to Israel in one plan. (See maps this page). Gvirtzman's bottom line would enlarge the areas under complete Palestinian control (area A) ten times over -- from 2.7 to 27 percent of the West Bank ­ and bring 1.2 million Palestinians under complete Palestinian authority jurisdiction (up from the 0.6 million today), while maintaining Israeli control over all settlements and the critical underground aquifers and military junctures. "This is the extent Israel can cede at this stage, short of a changed political reality that might come in a final status settlement", says Gvirtzman.

Israeli Settlement Blocs

 

Inbar and Sandler set out to "sensitize the foreign policy community to the potential implications ­ and potential risks ­ both to Israel and the wider middle east, of a Palestinian state", given that it "is almost a fait accompli". "Even if a Palestinian state is inevitable because the status quo is not tenable in the long run", they write, 'it is necessary to evaluate its potential risks and seek to mitigate them". Their conclusions challenge the now widely-held thesis that establishment of a Palestinian state will bring about regional stability.

Areas Vital to Israeli Security (blue -- greater Jerusalem; purple -- defense sectors)

 

The authors conclude: "Based upon current Palestinian politics, a Palestinian state will probably be authoritarian and will include radical elements in its foreign policy. It could become a threat to its neighbors ­ Israel and Jordan ­ and to the interests of Saudi Arabia and other western allies. A Palestinian state could also turn into a haven for international terrorism."

Since the Palestinian state is nevertheless "under construction", Inbar and Sandler recommend a number of precautionary guidelines to policy-makers: prolong the timetable for establishment of the state; deny it control over critical strategic areas; and limit its sovereignty by linking it with Jordan, or through demilitarization and other foreign policy limitations.

"We will continue to study all aspects of the diplomatic process and present differing points-of-view to the decision-making elite", says Inbar.